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Abstract 
 
New Zealand’s electricity sector has undergone considerable change in the three decades to 
2015. Those changes are part of a broader shift within the political landscape, from state 
intervention to market dominance and the view of individuals as consumers. An ill-fated policy 
proposal in 2013 called NZ Power sought to reduce electricity prices, and implement structural 
reform that would reverse decades of change within the sector. 
This thesis examines the context in which the reforms to the sector occurred so as to understand 
better why some policies are successfully implemented and other proposals fail. Specifically, 
this thesis examines the triumvirate of principal goals the sector has sought to achieve, and the 
political discourse around them: security of supply, economically efficient prices, and 
minimising environmental damage. From these insights, a framework is constructed against 
which future policies can be assessed as to the likelihood of their successful implementation.  
 
Key words: Electricity; NZ Power; governmentality; Overton Window; policy 
incrementalism; markets.  
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Introduction 
 
Laws are not created in a vacuum; rather they are created in response to, and moulded by, 
various different stakeholders, and economic and social drivers, including ideas which are the 
conventional wisdom or the cutting edge notions of the day. Understanding these circumstances 
and stakeholders can provide insight into the way policy is crafted, and the probable reception 
new policy will have among affected groups. 
In April 2013, the Labour and Green opposition parties announced separate but related policies 
for the management of New Zealand’s electricity sector – called NZ Power. Coming after more 
than two decades of increased emphasis on the role of the market in the sector, the proposal 
sought to limit the role of market forces in the industry. At the same time, with the seemingly 
related increases in the retail price of electricity, the policy seeks to minimise the price paid by 
residential consumers to retailers for electricity, to reduce the bargaining position of established 
electricity providers, and to decrease “fuel poverty” amongst New Zealanders. 
Over the past two decades, New Zealand has witnessed some of the fastest-growing residential 
retail prices in electricity, relative to other nations in the OECD. This is in a context where 
commercial and industrial prices have been relatively flat. The NZ Power policy was crafted 
to attempt to remedy this situation, and to increase the sustainability of electricity generation 
in New Zealand by putting an effective price on the use of water as a resource. 
There has been considerable and ongoing academic and professional discussion on the 
necessity for reform in New Zealand’s electricity sector. Dr Geoff Bertram, an energy 
economist and commentator, has described New Zealand’s electricity sector as a mechanism 
for massive wealth transfer from consumers to ‘gentailers’ – companies like Contact Energy 
or Meridian Energy that generate and sell electricity on the wholesale market, but also act as 
electricity retailers (Bertram 2006). Bertram and others describe it as a failed market, where 
residential and small-business consumers lack countervailing power against what is effectively 
a gentailer cartel, and government has been “out of touch” (New Zealand Labour Party 2013) 
with its response to rising prices. 
By contrast, key electricity sector spokespeople have maintained that the status quo allows for 
competition within the market, resulting in reliable electricity provision at the lowest economic 
price for consumers: 
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“[T]he 2013 results indicate that stronger competition in the electricity market is 
bringing results…The new analysis shows the costs incurred by electricity retailers 
over the last three years increased by 21.5% whereas prices charged to consumers 
over the same period went up by 12.5%...this shows competition is forcing 
electricity retailers to absorb some of the cost increases” (Electricity Authority 
2014).  
Any policy that would effect change in the energy sector will be constructed in a competitive 
policy environment: where consumers, generators and retailers, industry experts, and 
politicians are vying to communicate their views and ensure that their interests are maximised, 
even at a cost to other stakeholders. There is also a range of goals espoused – some stakeholders 
emphasise equity, some price efficiency, some efficiency, and others environmental and 
economic sustainability.  
This research is concerned with the depth, breadth, and nature of discourse about policy 
changes in the electricity sector. It examines, in particular, the debate on the likely efficacy of, 
and justification for, the NZ Power proposal in addressing the sector’s goals. The NZ Power 
debate can be used as a representation of the state of the debate on policy change within the 
sector, illuminating the wider interests in the electricity market of New Zealand, and the nature 
of free debate that gives rise to new policy. In short: is this a debate driven by reason and logic, 
and the careful weighing of objectives, or one dominated by emotion and special interests? In 
particular, have environmental concerns and issues been considered, or adequately articulated; 
or are other concerns dominant? In these debates, whose perspectives are being privileged, and 
do the media contribute constructively to debate, or are they means for other actors to control 
the debate?  
While a broad understanding of the efficacy of the proposal in a technical sense will be useful 
in examining some of the issues under discussion, this research does not develop a full technical 
analysis of the proposal. 
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Part A: Context and a review of the relevant literature  
Chapter 1: Context -- An Environment of Change   
  
1.1 The electricity market 
 
The New Zealand electricity sector has shifted radically over the past two decades. Starting 
from a government owned and operated network, where prices and consumption were dictated 
by the Electricity Division of the Ministry of Energy, the sector is now a largely unregulated 
market, with prices, consumption, and other facets controlled by generators and retailers, 
influenced by demand. The aspects of that market that retain considerable regulation are largely 
the natural monopolies involved with distribution and transmission. 
In the 1990s, New Zealand’s electricity sector was deregulated and broken into several 
different components, with the goal of increasing competitive forces, and in so doing, lowering 
prices for consumers.  
 
There are six key components of the electricity sector in New Zealand (see Figure 1). The first 
is generation, whose role is to provide electricity for consumers, and to use their revenues for 
maintenance of existing plants, and to invest in future generation capacity. The second 
component is transmission, which is responsible for maintaining the “grid” - the high voltage 
network of power-lines that criss-cross New Zealand. The transmission monopoly – 
Transpower - is also responsible for operating the market for electricity. The third component 
is distribution, which is responsible for the local delivery of electricity from the high-voltage 
grid, into a format that is more easily used by consumers. Fourthly, there is the retail market, 
which is responsible for buying electricity from generators, and on-selling that to consumers. 
Fifthly there are consumers, whose consumption for the most part is met by retailers, and 
whose demands alter the behaviour of other actors in the market. The final major component 
is the regulators – largely the Electricity Authority – which is responsible for ensuring the first 
four components of the sector are acting in accordance with the law, and in a manner that is 
beneficial for consumers. The following will go further into the role of these components.  
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New Zealand’s electricity generation is highly centralised, with at least 95% of electricity 
production coming from major generation plants (MBIE 2014), rather than distributed 
generation sources such as solar photovoltaics (PV) – as is more commonly seen overseas (B. 
V. Mathiesen 2011). Examples of major plant include Mighty River Power’s hydroelectric 
dams, Genesis Energy’s Huntly power plants, and Contact Energy’s hydro- and geothermal 
power plants.  
 
The bulk (75%) of generation is from renewable sources (MBIE 2014), with the balance made 
up of thermal generation. Of this, the share of relatively more environmentally harmful coal 
Figure 1: simplified version of New Zealand’s electricity market structure.  
Note: only major generators and retailers are noted, and three (3) 
distribution companies listed.  
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has been decreasing, with the relatively less harmful (but still carbon-intensive) natural gas 
filling the gap in generation requirements. 
 
It is important to note, particularly for the discussion in Part 3, that as much as three quarters 
of New Zealand’s electricity is supplied by hydroelectric power stations (MBIE 2014). This 
matters, as rainfall and inflows into the hydrolakes vary from year to year, and within a year. 
Instances of high inflows into the lakes generally means greater generation capacity and output 
of those plants. As hydroelectricity accounts for such a considerable proportion of New 
Zealand’s generation capacity, even minor changes in lake inflow levels can have considerable 
impacts on nationwide generation capacity and wholesale electricity prices. 
 
The transmission component of electricity across the national grid is owned and administered 
by a state owned enterprise, Transpower. The company owns and manages the inter-regional 
transmission of electricity. Transmission of electricity is a natural monopoly, and as such, the 
company is highly regulated to prevent it from extracting monopoly rents from the market. 
Transpower also acts as the System Operator of the electricity supply on the national grid. This 
means Transpower manages the second-to-second demand and supply in the electricity market 
so as to ensure supply meets demand, and there are no problematic fluctuations or interruptions 
in voltage, or other aspects of the supply of electricity (Bertram 2007).   
 
Intra-regional transmission –‘distribution’ – is managed by a network of small companies that 
are either privately owned, or owned in trust for the region they service. Again, the companies 
providing distribution are tightly regulated regarding the prices they can set, and the investment 
into infrastructure they must make. Unlike overseas examples – particularly the United States 
– distribution companies like Vector or WEL Networks do not sell retail consumers electricity. 
Rather, they provide the local lines infrastructure that allows the flow of electricity from 
Transpower to individual consumers (Evans and Meade 2005).  
 
The bodies responsible for the sale of electricity to consumers are retailers. Companies such as 
Contact Energy or Meridian Energy purchase electricity from generators on the wholesale 
market. That electricity is then on-sold to end consumers. Sales are measured by metering 
individual Installation Control Points (ICPs), through which electricity must travel to get to a 
consumer from the distribution network (Reilly 2008). 
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It should be noted that the original intent of the crafters of New Zealand’s current electricity 
sector was to create strong separation among these four parts of the energy sector; with high 
competition within the generation and retail sub-sectors, and high levels of protection for 
consumers in the natural monopolies of transmission and distribution. The aim in so doing was 
to ensure that prices reflect the economic cost of energy, or the cost of infrastructure. The first 
(structural) aspect of competitive separation has certainly not happened. New Zealand’s retail 
and generation arms are controlled by the five large electricity companies – referred to as 
gentailers. These companies, as outlined in Figure 1, are Contact Energy, Genesis Energy, 
Might River Power, Meridian Energy, and Mercury Energy. The companies are vertically 
integrated, in that they have a presence in both the generation and retail sale of electricity. So, 
while transmission and distribution play clearly distinct roles, the generation and retail arms 
are integrated. Practically, it means that energy gentailers can hedge their economic 
performance across the two sectors: in situations where returns from the wholesale market are 
low, the retail arm can be used to maintain profit, and vice versa. In theory, it could mean that 
a gentailer’s retailer arm purchases directly from its generator arm, exercising a degree of 
control over the market (NZX Energy 2009). 
 
The lack of an arm’s length transaction is monitored by the Electricity Authority (the 
Authority), which is the electricity market regulator. The Authority administers the Electricity 
Industry Participation Code, to which all actors on the supply side of the electricity industry 
must adhere. Part of the Code’s function is to ensure that, as much as is practicable, the two 
arms of a gentailer remain separate. This is facilitated largely through the electricity auction 
system, where all generators must provide all of their generated electricity to the auction. This 
means that a gentailer cannot set aside electricity to sell directly to its retail arm. In the light of 
this, it can be argued that there is limited scope for any one gentailer to control the price of 
electricity, although (other) oligopolistic practices are not excluded (MBIE 2013).  
 
As to the goal of ensuring competition: there are, as of 11 February 2015, 27 retail brands from 
21 different retail companies comprise the retail market in New Zealand (Bridges 2015), 
whereas, before the reforms that led to the current market structure, there was one centrally-
run organisation that had considerable influence – both in the sense of owning and operating 
infrastructure, and in the setting of the sector rules – in all four aspects of the New Zealand 
electricity industry (generation, transmission, distribution, and retail). There has certainly been 
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a growth in the competition pressures in the retail side of the electricity market as a 
consequence of a greater number of retailers competing for customers.  
 
It is reasonable to ask whether this system could be simplified for an individual consumer 
wanting to avoid engaging with such a complex market. The reality of the sector, however, is 
that for the vast majority of consumers, all components of the sector are necessarily engaged – 
even if by proxy. Unless a consumer is ‘off the grid’, generating their own electricity, they will 
at minimum need to interact with the generation, transmission, and distribution components in 
order for them to have electricity made, and delivered to them. To then engage directly with 
the spot market for electricity (more on this later), and deal with generators directly requires 
an ability to absorb considerable financial risk and technical know-how. It is for these reasons 
that the vast majority of consumers buy their power from established, nation-wide retailers.   
 
In generation, New Zealand’s electricity market is dominated by five large companies.  These 
five companies are responsible for around 91% of installed capacity – or 10,000MW of 
capacity out of a national total of approximately 11,000MW (MBIE 2014). At the same time, 
at the retail end of the market, those same five companies – gentailers – account for 
approximately 93.4% of electricity connections (ICPs):  
 
Generators Share of 
Market 
Retailers Share of 
Market 
Genesis Energy 14% Genesis Energy 27% 
Contact Energy 24% Contact Energy 22% 
Mighty River Power (including 
subsidiaries) 
15% 
Mighty River Power (including 
subsidiaries) 
19% 
Meridian Energy 33% Meridian Energy 14% 
Trustpower 5% Trustpower 11% 
Others 9% Others 6% 
 
 
 
Table 1: Generator and retailer market shares, 2014 (MBIE 2014). 
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The established retailers are losing market share: in 2005, these five gentailers supplied 97.7% 
of ICPs, whereas in 2013, the percent controlled by that group was 93.6%  (Energy Information 
and Modelling Group 2011). But the growth of competition is slow. While 20% of residential 
customers in 2013 changed their retailer (Electricity Authority 2014), the data suggests the 
bulk of those shifts occurred within the top five retailers.  
 
The advantage which established gentailers have is further enhanced with new competition 
being focused in specific geographies. Pulse Energy, for instance, is a retailer whose customer 
base as of March 2014 is almost entirely within the Nelson-Buller region – owing largely to 
the Buller Electricity distribution company’s majority stake holding in the company. – Until 
early 2015, Flick Energy was only available in Wellington. It remains to be seen how much 
further competition will grow within the retail sector. Within the generation sector, owing to 
the high costs of investing in large-scale energy production, there has not been a growth in 
competition since the 2008 market review. This is largely as the established generators have 
the capital available to invest in new generation capacity, and in so doing, ensure their own 
market position (Interview with Gareth Hughes 2014). 
 
1.2 A Short History of Reform  
 
Prior to 1987, the New Zealand electricity sector was managed through a centralised system. 
Through the Electricity Department, Ministry of Works, and The Treasury; different parts of 
central government were responsible for generation, transmission, and investment in 
electricity; while distribution was managed by local body departments. Before 1984, electricity 
in New Zealand was not considered a commodity like computers or phones (or whatever the 
pre-1980s version of that was). Rather, electricity was something closer to healthcare or 
policing: where, either because of populist leaders (Interview with Business New Zealand 
2014), or idealist governments (Interview with Jessica Wilson and Susan Guthrie 2014), the 
state was responsible for all aspects of the sector. 
In a functional sense, this meant that, as regards investment in infrastructure, the state (and 
therefore: taxpayers) bore the cost of investment. This was particularly evident in the 1970s 
where Muldoon’s “Think Big” policies culminated in the construction of the Clyde Dam. In 
addition to paying for new generation, the government also set prices for electricity. This 
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resulted in prices being tailored not to the long-term marginal cost of production, but to a 
system where prices were lowest to those who had the greatest political capital: “As companies 
cannot vote, they didn’t get [the cheaper prices]” (Interview with Business New Zealand 2014). 
This led to a cross-subsidisation of residential power prices, while industry paid higher prices. 
The impetus for change from this point on will be explored in chapter 3.  
Across the years of policy change, there have been five main tranches of reforms (Hansen 2014; 
Evans and Meade 2005; Bertram 2006; Martin, 1991): 
1. From 1984 to 1986, the McLachlan report to Treasury (Interview with Nick Wilson 
2014; Interview with Business New Zealand 2014) encouraged the adoption of a 
corporate model for the running of the electricity sector; 
2. Between 1987 and 1995, the Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ) and 
Transpower were established, and a broader corporatisation of the sector developed to 
influence prices and investment decisions. The ECNZ was set up as a company under 
the State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) Act, to own and operate the generation and 
transmission assets of the Ministry of Energy. Policy and regulatory responsibilities 
were separated out and largely retained in the Ministry of Energy.  
The SOE Act was a component of the then Government's moves to improve the 
performance and accountability of the public sector. SOEs are companies in which 
nominated Ministers hold all the shares, and the enterprises negotiate annual Statements 
of Corporate Intent (SCls) with shareholding Ministers. SOEs operate with commercial 
structures and incentives and with the principal objective of being successful 
businesses. This moves pricing decisions away from being a political tool (Interview 
with Business New Zealand 2014), to more reflecting the actual long-run marginal cost 
of production. The reforms in the electricity sector were consistent with wider, market-
based reforms across the New Zealand energy sector (Rogernomics). (Ring & Read, 
1996). Other such SOEs included State Insurance, BNZ, and Tranz Rail. 
3. From 1996 to 2001, a wholesale market for electricity was established, and the sector 
saw a light-handed government approach to regulation. The transitional ECNZ was 
broken into several corporations, in order to stimulate competition. These include 
Contact Energy (which was privatised in 1999), Meridian Energy, Mercury Energy, 
and Genesis Energy. Individual retail companies entered into long-term hedge contract 
with wholesalers. Owing to the relative strength of the established Gentailers, there has 
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been fairly limited competition that has emerged, resulting in a quasi-oligopoly 
emerging in the market.  
4. From 2002-2008, a scaling back of the light-handed government approach to regulation 
in the market. Establishment of the Electricity Commission (2003), mandated asset-
swaps for Gentailers (2006), investigation into establishment of a single-buyer model 
for electricity (2006), which was eventually rejected.  Establishment of the Electricity 
Commission. 
5. From 2008-present, reforms put a far larger emphasis on implementing market tools, 
such as a heavier reliance on the spot market, futures market, and other ancillary 
services. The establishment of first the Electricity Commission, and then the Electricity 
Authority fettered some of the extremes of the electricity market, aligning market 
players with the Electricity Industry Participation Code.  
In 1984, the McLachlan report to the Minister for Energy recommended an overhaul of the 
electricity sector, noting in particular inaccurate pricing leading to poor investment decisions 
– threatening future supply. Economists, such as Nobel-Prize winner Vernon Smith, and Paul 
Joskow provided additional intellectual impetus for market-based reform to, in part, better 
protect supply security (Joskow 2008). Additionally, the overarching set of tools used by 
governments during this period across the OECD was that of market principles. While there 
were other factors that led to a market for electricity, that markets were de rigueur as regards 
policy at the time no doubt played a central role (Interview with Business New Zealand 2014).  
The retreat from a centrally planned electricity sector proved a complex process. The New 
Zealand Electricity Department became the Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ) 
on 1 April 1987. ECNZ was a vertically integrated single-buyer and seller, established in part 
as a transition entity through the deregulation period. (L. Evans 2014) In 1994, transmission of 
electricity fell under the purview of a separate entity; Transpower. In 1996, ECNZ was divided 
further, with Contact Energy being sold and becoming the second major generator in the 
electricity market, and ECNZ being divided into three State Owned Enterprises, namely 
Meridian Energy, Genesis Energy, and Mighty River Power. 
Since 2005, the level of competition in the electricity sector has increased significantly. This 
has been because of an increase in the number of market players, and an increase in consumer 
choice causing companies to be more competitive in their behaviour to ensure customers’ 
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loyalty. The Electricity Authority and government policy more broadly, has lowered barriers 
to entry, increasing levels of competition.   
In addition to increased competition, NZX Energy (the electricity market operator) has 
developed new market products which have been adopted by the market. These include the 
ability to trade in electricity futures, with the most recent tranche of reforms undertaken in 
2009.  
The spot market was volatile in its early stages, and posed risks to unhedged market participants 
(L. Evans 2014). The market – spot and hedge combined – is now seen by Evans and the 
Authority as maturing. Dry years have not caused the high prices they once did (Hansen 2014). 
New financial instruments, such as the futures market introduced in 2009 through the 
Australian Stock Exchange, and trades through this market now account for 50% of hedge 
contracts. Additionally, of the remaining trade, 98% of the number of electricity trades have 
been done via the spot market since the 2009 reforms. (Hansen 2014). The market has a much 
greater level of liquidity, as indicated by the number and value of trades. This increase in 
liquidity, coupled with a rise in the use of price hedging has seen a decrease in price volatility.  
In short, reforms to the New Zealand Electricity Sector have seen: 
- The corporations that own the generation and retail sale of electricity develop from the 
NZED, to the ECNZ, to fifteen electricity retailers operating between them 29 retail 
brands;  
- The privatisation (either partial or whole) of those electricity 
retailers/wholesalers/gentailers. 
The legislative and regulatory history for the industry has been varied, with major governing 
acts and bodies including: 
The Energy Companies Act 1992 commercialised the existing Electricity Power Boards and 
Municipal Electricity Departments, establishing organisations responsible for the distribution 
and retail sale of electricity. The successor legislation, the Electricity Industry Reform Act 
1998, sought to distribute the electricity companies’ power, by forcing companies to retain only 
their lines assets, or retail assets. This was done with the intention of decreasing power held by 
established and vertically integrated companies. This was seen as being especially important 
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as lines assets act as a natural monopoly, and separating those companies into independent 
companies made for easier regulation of pricing and other activity.  
The Electricity Commission was established in 2003. As the market facilitator, the Commission 
was responsible for developing and enforcing the specific rules of the market. While this did 
not involve competition-related aspects of the industry (as this was the purview of the 
Commerce Commission), it did oversee the enforcement of trades, and managed broader 
market opportunities within the industry. In addition to these responsibilities, the Commission 
oversaw the investment into the national grid through facilitating and approving investment 
proposals.  
The Commission was also responsible for promoting electricity efficiency, and managing 
reserve energy and emergency campaigns. This is a role that has largely been replaced by the 
Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (EECA), for policy developers saw the roles of 
the market operator, and of promoting of policies that might affect consumer choice, as being 
different. (NZX Energy 2009). The reasons for the changes will be further discussed in the 
third chapter of this thesis.  
The successor to the Commission was the Electricity Authority. Established under the 
Electricity Industry Act 2010, The Authority shares many of the same market functions as the 
Commission, particularly around rule management and enforcement. However, many of the 
other rules have been pared to other government agencies.   
The Electricity Industry Participation Code was introduced in 2010 as part of the reform of the 
Commission. The Code sets out the duties and responsibilities that apply to industry 
participants and the Authority. The Code is the most recent iteration of the ‘rules’ which govern 
the Electricity Market, as created and enforced by the Authority.  
Another way of considering the reforms is to categorise the intended consequence of the change 
(NZX Energy 2009). The sector’s development can be broadly categorised into three main 
areas of focus – referred to by the World Energy Council as the “trilemma”. The “tri-” refers 
to the three goals of an electricity sector – equity (or: the ability for consumers, especially 
residential and poorer consumers, to pay); security (or: ensuring the people can access power 
when they want it), and sustainability (or: ensuring as much as possible that natural state of the 
environment is protected. This does not necessarily mean ensuring, for instance, carbon 
neutrality, but is in fact broader. By way of example: the development of wind farms is a low-
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carbon way to generate energy, but many – particularly those who can see the farms – believe 
they are an unacceptable blight on the natural environment). The “-lemma” component refers 
to the idea that the three goals are to an extent incompatible, and policy can only ever achieve 
two of the three goals at any one time. (Henze 2009). Having cheap and secure electricity 
usually necessitates an increase in investment in relatively cheap and highly reliable thermal 
plants, powered by coal or oil (Interview with James Flannery 2014). Cheap and 
environmentally sustainable energy limits the amount of investment available for increased 
generation, increasing the risk that supply of electricity will outstrip demand, causing blackouts 
(Interview with Nick Wilson 2014). Environmentally sustainable, secure energy usually 
requires significant investment – increasing the financial cost to consumers (Interview with Dr. 
Andrew Kerr and Alannah MacShane 2014). All of these outcomes require trade-offs and will 
result in financial and non-financial impacts on end-users and the environment. 
The following table (Table 2) summarises the above changes, and some other important sector 
events.  
Year   Important events Equity Security Sustainability 
1984     
McLauchlan Report: 
significant overspend 
on electricity. 
Highest security 
margins. 
  
1985           
1986   
The State Owned 
Enterprises Act given 
Royal Ascent.  
State-Owned 
institutions had to act 
as if they were 
privately held 
companies – 
generating a return to 
its shareholder (the 
government).   
    
1987   
ECNZ created under 
State Owned 
Enterprises Act. 
      
1988   
Transpower  set 
up as an SOE from 
within ECNZ (though 
the split took until 
April 1994 to realise). 
      
1989           
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Year   Important events Equity Security Sustainability 
1990 
   May 1990 (Labour) – 
regional electricity 
companies 
corporatized.  
      
 
1991           
1992   
 Government releases 
energy policy 
framework: "The 
Government's key 
objective in the energy 
area is to ensure that 
energy 
services continue to 
be available at the 
lowest cost to the 
economy, 
consistent with  
sustainable 
development. 
"This will be achieved 
by the efficient and 
effective provision of 
energy 
services through 
properly functioning 
commercial systems 
with competitive 
incentives. These 
systems will work 
within an effective and 
stable regulatory 
environment and take 
energy conservation 
into account." 
  
1992 Winter Power 
Crisis: voluntary 
savings of 10% of 
demand were called 
for by ECNZ. 
  
1993   
 Electricity Act passed 
to deregulate regional 
electricity companies, 
removing their 
statutory monopoly 
 Trustpower – New 
Zealand’s first private 
electricity company – 
formed. 
Wholesale Market 
Development Group: 
Considered single 
buyer. 
Government Policy 
Statement on 
Renewable Energy. 
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Year   Important events Equity Security Sustainability 
and requiring them to 
maintain line services 
until 2013. 
1994     
Removal of 
statutory monopoly 
over supply of power 
to consumers. 
    
1995           
1996   
Contact Energy 
separated from 
ECNZ;  
Wholesale market 
established. 
  Auckland CBD Crisis.   
1997           
1998           
1999 
  
Mighty River Power, 
Genesis, and Meridian 
Energy formed. 
Separation of 
competitive, and non-
competitive 
components of 
electricity companies 
– i.e., lines companies 
from energy retailers.  
    
 
2000     
2000 Ministerial 
Inquiry: price control 
introduced for 
distribution 
component. 
  
2000 Ministerial 
Inquiry: Encourages 
distributed renewable 
generation. 
2001       
2001 Winter Power 
Crisis. 
  
2002   
Electricity Complaints 
Commission 
established to hear 
and resolve consumer 
complaints. 
The development of 
an index for fixed 
price electricity 
contracts to provide 
some means of 
establishing a forward 
price curve for 
electricity. 
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Year   Important events Equity Security Sustainability 
2003   
End of "light handed" 
regulatory regime: the 
Electricity 
Commission was 
announced to take 
over governance of 
the industry. 
 
The government 
established a 
government-owned 
diesel powered 
generation plant 
(Whirinaki). 
 
 The EC started in 
September 2003 and 
by 2009 had charged 
electricity consumers 
nearly $150m, 
recovered through 
consumers’ electricity 
bills. 
 
Whirinaki used when 
spot prices for 
electricity were ‘too 
high’.  
2003 Winter Power 
Crisis: Emphasis on 
dry year risk by 
Government leads to 
investment in 
Whirinaki. 
 
Maui Gas price 
renegotiated from 
price legacy contract 
to more market-based 
prices.  
 
The EC was charged 
with ensuring security 
of supply and 
approving the capital 
investment plans of 
industry players for 
generation and 
transmission. 
  
2004           
2005     
2005 Commerce 
Commission 
investigation into 
prices. 
    
2006   
 2006 Ministerial 
Electricity Market 
Review: Considers 
increasing retail prices 
and security of 
supply. Recommends 
continuation of 
market; rejects single-
buyer model. 
Review endorsed: 
transferring Tekapo A 
and B power stations 
from Meridian Energy 
to Genesis 
Energy, and 
transferring the 
government-owned 
Whirinaki to Meridian 
Energy 
requiring Meridian 
Energy, Genesis 
Energy and Mighty 
 Requiring generators 
or retailers to 
compensate 
consumers in the 
event of 
conservation 
campaigns or a dry-
year power cut; 
abolishing the reserve 
energy scheme; and 
increasing the 
attractiveness of gas 
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Year   Important events Equity Security Sustainability 
River Power to 
undertake a 
"virtual asset swap" 
through a 15 year 
contract, ensuring the 
ability of each 
company to provide 
increased competition 
in the island where 
they currently had 
little or no generation 
capacity; 
requiring all major 
electricity generators 
to put in place an 
accessible electricity 
hedge market; 
allowing lines 
companies back into 
electricity retailing, 
subject to strict 
controls; 
and establishing a $15 
million fund over 
three years to promote 
customer switching 
between retailers. 
exploration and 
development. 
2007           
2008 
  
  
2008 Electricity 
Commission review 
of market design. 
2008 Winter supply 
shortage. 
 
EC approval for 
Transpower to spend 
up to $672 million in 
upgrading Pole One 
of the HVDC link 
between the South 
and North Islands 
2008 Act passed 
establishing ETS, and 
prohibiting thermal 
generation (later 
repealed). 90% 
renewables by 2025 
target passed.  
 
Moratorium on coal-
fired power plans. 
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Year   Important events Equity Security Sustainability 
2009   
Establishment of 
Electricity Authority 
(EA). 
2009 Ministerial 
Review: Pro-
Competitive reforms.  
HVDC Pole 3 / 
NIGUP approved. 
 
Transpower 
announced a $50 
million programme of 
upgrading work on 
the national 
transmission grid. 
  
2010          
2011         
 National Policy 
Statement on 
Renewable Electricity 
Generation under the 
Resource 
Management Act.  
2012       
2012 Lowest first half 
inflows on record. 
The Authority notes 
security of supply and 
prices robust in spite 
of these challenges. 
  
2013   
 Sale of SOEs as part 
of partial privatisation 
programme.  
Labour/Greens 
propose separate but 
related NZ Power 
proposals. 
Summer drought - no 
supply impact.  
  
2014  
Continued partial sale 
of SOEs. 
   
   
  Labour-led Government 
  National-led Government 
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1.3 Electricity Prices 
1.3(a) How does the market work in 2015? 
 
There are two significant markets for electricity: the spot market, and long-term hedge market. 
The spot market offers generators and retailers to trade in real-time for electricity to supply 
demand. The long-term hedge market allows for market players to agree on a price for, and a 
quantity of, electricity over a longer period – typically years. This section briefly explains both 
these markets. 
 
In the spot market, individual generators provide prices to the market at 52 different Grid 
Injection Points (GIPs). Retailers then bid for and buy that electricity, which then leaves the 
grid (and thus enters distribution networks) at 196 different Grid Exit Points (GXPs). 
 
The mechanism by which the price for electricity is set is through a process called “Local 
Marginal Pricing”. Marginal pricing is where the price paid for a good is equivalent to the cost 
of the next unit of that good, and reflects the system used in most markets to price goods. The 
“Local” part of local marginal pricing refers to prices being set across 248 nodes (Bertram, 
Restructuring the New Zealand Electricity Sector 1984-2005 2007). GIPs and GXPs are the 
specific places in the grid where power enters the grid from plants, leaves the high voltage 
transmission component, and enters the lower-voltage distribution networks. Bidding– 
explained below – happens in regard to these specific locations. The large number of 
differentiated prices is to reflect the different cost in providing electricity in those areas. In 
short, the further demand is from a power source, the greater the energy losses that are incurred. 
Those losses, even though not powering anything, have to be accounted for as their generation 
still costs money. The consumers in a sense cause those losses, and so pay for them. 
 
This is particularly relevant in the New Zealand electricity market, owing to the nature of the 
product. When one buys electricity from the likes of Contact Energy, one is not buying the 
power “Contact Energy” makes in their power plants. Rather, what happens is that electricity 
enters a common pool, alongside all the other electricity produced by all the other generators 
that are connected to the grid – making each kilowatt hour that is available indistinguishable 
and completely fungible. As David Parker says: “An electron is an electron” (Interview with 
the Hon. Dr David Parker 2014). Individual electricity retailers then “bid” for that electricity, 
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and on-sell that to individual customers. The price paid for the electricity by retailers is the 
marginal price for electricity – i.e. whatever the price would be for an additional unit of 
electricity to be added to that common pool. Once the retailers’ bids have been accepted by 
generators, the market is said to have “cleared”. Retailers place their own mark-up or premium 
on that price to cover the costs of access to that market that they face. Retailers also add on the 
cost of the network and distribution charges that they incur. Finally, that electricity is billed to 
the customer, with that price incorporating all of those costs (Interview with Professor Lewis 
Evans 2014).  
 
A simplified explanation to provide some understanding of the market mechanisms as follows. 
In a simplified market for electricity, there are three wholesalers of electricity, generators A, 
B, and C. At a given GXP, generator A offers 30MWh at 5c/kWh, generator B offers 40MWh 
at 10c/kWh, and generator C offers 30MWh at 20c/kWh. Purchasers of electricity do not 
purchase generator A’s electricity at 5c/kWh, and then some of generator B’s electricity at 
10c/kWh. Rather, because of the marginal pricing mechanism, they must pay the marginal price 
for electricity. 
 
In the instance where a given selection of retailers requires (demands) 69MWh of electricity, 
they will bid for the cheapest 69MWh – here produced by generators A and B. As such, the 
marginal price for electricity will be 10c/kWh, even though 30MWh is offered at 5c/kWh. In 
an instance where 100MWh is required, all three generators’ offers will be needed, and as the 
highest price bid is 20c/kWh, that will be the price paid for each kWh (NZX Energy 2009). As 
in other jurisdictions, marginal pricing is done in New Zealand as our generation infrastructure 
comprises some generation with low marginal costs – such as hydroelectric dams, and some 
with very high marginal costs, such as coal.  
 
The second market is the long-term hedge market. This is largely a more informal set of 
agreements between electricity wholesalers, who will contract to provide a fixed amount of 
electricity to the purchaser at a fixed price. Contracting with a generator to provide a set amount 
of electricity at a set price functionally increases the ‘supply’ capacity of the purchaser; and 
reduces the amount available to the seller. It is done because the purchaser must have access to 
that electricity, and control over to whom that electricity is sold. The generators will agree to 
sell energy at a set rate and volume because they believe that the actual cost of production for 
that electricity at the point when it is supplied will be less than the contract price at which it is 
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sold to the purchaser. They will endeavour to do this through refining their generation practices 
to make the average cost of production lower; or will use that fixed revenue as an avenue to 
invest in new production sources. Broadly, purchasers will buy into the hedge as they believe 
that the electricity will be provided to them at a price below the (future) price that they could 
otherwise purchase from the spot market, or achieve with their own means of generation (NZX 
Energy 2009).  
 
Hedge contracts are important for companies as they increase certainty in costs and revenues. 
This certainty can result in lower prices for consumers. Additionally, the hedge market provides 
clear signals to generators on whether they should invest in new sources of electricity: in 
instances where the hedged price per unit is higher than the cost of the unit from a new 
generation source, then it makes sense to invest in that source. Hedge prices lower than the cost 
of new production clearly signals that investment is not wise. 
 
1.3(b) A history of Prices 
The five-year annual average electricity price from 1979 to 2011 is shown below on Figure 2:  
 
Figure 2: Average real electricity price 1979-2011, 2011 cents per kWh. (Bertram 2013) 
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As implied above, electricity is sold in discrete units – typically megawatt ‘hours or kilowatt 
hours. To be charged for one kilowatt hour, for instance, means that, across the course of an 
hour, what is consumed is one kilowatt of electricity. In New Zealand, the prices charged to all 
consumers for those units of electricity have increased in nominal terms by an average of 4% 
per annum since 1996 (Electricity Authority 2014). However, in real terms, prices are not much 
higher now on average than they were in the early 1980s.  
This is not true for individual consumer types. Residential consumers have seen significant 
increases in real terms, while commercial consumers have experienced a significant reduction 
in charges (Electricity Authority 2014).  
In 1984, the average real price paid for electricity was  for a residential customer, 13.28 c/kWh; 
for industry 10.54 c/kWh, and for commercial entities 20.89 c/kWh (all figures in 2012 dollars). 
As noted above, prices were set in large part by the government, based on advice from officials 
and political judgment. In 2012, the most recent figure on prices available at time of writing, 
prices for a residential customer were 27.38 c/kWh; for industry 10.57 c/kWh, and for 
commercial entities 17.19 c/kWh (in 2012 dollars) (Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment 2013). 
In 1984, the price paid by residential consumers was approximately 126% of that paid by 
industrial consumers. The price paid by residential consumers was approximately 64% of that 
paid by commercial consumers. In 2012, the price paid by residential consumers was 
approximately 259% of that paid by industrial consumers – more than twice the 1984 
proportion. The price paid by residential consumers was approximately 159% of that paid by 
commercial consumers – again, more than twice the 1984 proportion. 
The reasons suggested for this shift in burden-carrying include: 
1. Bargaining power. In most trades for goods or services, when one party has greater 
power in the bargain, the party can use that power to exact a better deal for themselves. 
It is posited that gentailers are a) in a position of power over some consumers, and b) 
that they use or exploit that power. There is certainly a perception that electricity 
retailers do have a significant power imbalance in their favour,1 and that they use that 
                                               
1 A stated impetus for NZ Power, as well as numerous other publications, is that gentailers have used their market 
power to extract excessive rents from their customers. (Bertram, Is there a ‘regulatory compact’ regarding 
gentailer asset values and revenues? If so, what does it say? 2013; Bertram, Restructuing the New Zealand 
Electricity Sector 1984-2005 2006; New Zealand Labour Party 2013) 
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power to their benefit. However, the presence of the Commerce Commission,2 which 
enforces laws against monopolist pricing, and growing (albeit limited) competition, 
indicates that this might not be correct.3 This will be analysed further below in Part 3.  
2. Profile of consumption. As a general rule, it is cheaper to produce a constant amount 
of electricity than to have the production vary. This is because there are costs associated 
with ramping up and down the production of electricity – especially where electricity 
generation already has high costs of production, such as with coal-fired power plants. 
In New Zealand, as with most electricity sectors, there are two broad categories of 
electricity consumption. Base load demand is met by geothermal plants, with low 
variable costs, and whose production is difficult to increase or decrease. Conversely, 
peak generation is what is produced when demand in a given market exceeds the base 
load. In New Zealand, consumption is lowest during the night, and higher during the 
day; with particular peaks in the mid-morning, and in the early evening. Peak load is 
usually met by gas-fired generators, or by hydro – both of which can be relatively easily 
varied.  
As discussed above, higher demand leads to broadly higher prices for electricity. 
Residential and commercial consumers account for the higher demand during the day, 
but it is largely residential consumers who account for the two daily peaks. The 
explanation given by the industry for the higher prices paid by residential consumers is 
that, on average, the bulk of their consumption occurs at the same time, requiring the 
highest prices for electricity (MBIE 2014). 
This is not the complete story, however, because while the prices on the spot market 
for electricity peak in this manner, most New Zealand residential customers are on what 
is called a fixed-price/variable quantity contract – essentially a hedge – where 
                                               
2 The Commerce Commission has a multi-faced role in the electricity sector. Governed by the Commerce Act and 
the Fair Trading Act, the Commission specifically addresses: Investigations into concerns an electricity business 
has undertaken misleading behaviour, acted in an anti-competitive manner against new market entrants, and 
increase information on Transpower’s performance and pricing structure. It specifically cannot govern what prices 
should be outside of these parameters. For individual consumers on a day-to-day basis, the Fair Trading Act 
component of the Commission’s role has a far greater influence on Retailer behaviour. The Commerce Act 
empowerment deals more with industry-wide issues of competitive behaviour – of relevance to transmission and 
distribution.  
3 The number of electricity retailers in New Zealand has been growing since the liberalisation of the sector. At 
present, there are 19 operating retailers in New Zealand, however the market is dominated by Genesis Energy and 
its subsidiaries, Contact Energy, Mercury Energy and its subsidiaries, and Meridian Energy and its subsidiaries. 
These companies account for around 83% of the connections in New Zealand. This percentage is, however, 
declining.  
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regardless of the time of day, the price is fixed, and is usually fixed at a price that 
reflects the price of electricity at peak times, or close to peak. This hedge is to insulate 
retailers from price variations during the day, and is considerably easier for most 
consumers to understand than varying prices. What this means, though, is that when a 
customer is consuming at peak times, they will be paying approximately what they 
would on the spot market, or less; in times of lower (spot) prices, they are paying 
considerably more than they would in the spot market. Of course, this cuts both ways – 
in instances where, because of exceptionally high demand, or short supply, spot prices 
are above that fixed hedge price, customers are essentially subsidised by the retail 
company for consuming electricity. This is, however, a rare occurrence. The typical 
advertised price for residential consumers in 2014 is around 27.59 cents per kWh 
(MBIE 2014). The spot market price for electricity has exceeded 27 cents per kWh for 
a half hour period in the 12 months to 31 March 2014 only twice (Interest.co.nz 2015), 
and averaged around one third of that price at 8c/kWh (Transpower 2015). One could 
interpret these data to suggest that the typical retail tariff compensates the retailers very 
well for supplying consumers with electricity, and that rarely are retailers out of pocket. 
According to the Electricity Authority, a typical residential electricity bill comprises 
the following cost components:  
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That retail residential prices have doubled over the past 30 years is a source of concern for 
many. Some commentators have said that the price increase faced by consumers in that period 
is unjustified, and an unfair consequence of the introduction of a market place (Interview with 
Gareth Hughes 2014; Interview with Jessica Wilson and Susan Guthrie 2014). Geoff Bertram 
put it rather emphatically, “If it's highway robbery, we lock those guys up. But if companies 
Figure 3: simplified version of a typical electricity bill, listing the cost components 
of that bill for a given kilowatt hour (The Electricity Authority 2013) 
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put a gun to your head and take your money, it's knighthoods and bonuses for the CEO” 
(Edmunds 2013). 
This anger, however, begs the question of whether the price that existed before the electricity 
reforms was an appropriate price for the resource. This debate will be examined in closer detail 
in Part 3.  
Prices paid on the spot market can fluctuate wildly. A large driver of this variability is the cost 
of production for electricity. As New Zealand’s generation capacity is substantially conditional 
upon lake inflow levels, consumers of electricity hope for consistent and sufficient inflow 
levels, so that – in short – dams can allow the same volume of water to flow through at all 
times, and produce the maximum MWh of electricity at all times. Because of the weather, this 
does not happen. Even within a day inflows can fluctuate considerably, and that variation 
causes much of the variation in the end price for electricity.  
Since the introduction of the spot market into New Zealand’s electricity sector, it has been easy 
to track, in real time, the wholesale price of electricity. What has been more difficult has been 
tracking the net retail price to residential consumers. This is for a number of reasons 
1. The spot market price does not necessarily reflect the advertised price of electricity to 
residential consumers. The vast majority of residential account holders in New Zealand 
do not have direct access to spot market prices. Rather, they pay for electricity under 
one of two general sets of pricing 
a. Time of Use pricing (sometimes known as “smart metering”). This is where the 
customer pays the marginal price for electricity in a given half hour period. In 
instances of high market demand, prices paid will be higher, and in instances of 
low demand prices are cheaper. The prices offered tend to reflect Spot Market 
prices.  
b. Non-half hourly pricing (sometimes known as fixed price / variable quantity 
pricing). This is where for a fixed price, customers can consume electricity at 
any time and pay a given price – regardless of the Spot Market prices.  
 
In both of these instances, prices are typically ‘hedged’ at a rate that is similar to the 
average Spot Market rate during a peak consumption period. This is so that Retailers 
are insulated against prolonged price spikes – particularly in winter. This also means 
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that Retailers enjoy typically very high prices at times when national consumption – 
and in turn prices on the Spot Market – are low.  
 
To accurately track the cost of electricity to retailers, it is not enough to simply monitor 
the Spot Market. Rather, an interrogation of prices offered from different Grid Exit 
Points to customers by various Retailers is needed. 
 
2. The prices quoted to many retail customers may still not reflect the true cost of a 
kilowatt hour of electricity. Many Retailers offer different discounts to customers in the 
form of prompt-payment discounts, lump-sum discounts (particularly to new 
customers), and other discounts to particularly large residential consumers. Without 
access to this information, the true price of electricity for residential consumers cannot 
be known, and the price of electricity without this information is only an approximation.   
 
There are some, however, who believe that the pricing mechanism is one that – rather than 
being an important pricing mechanism –acts to deliver “super-profits” for low-marginal cost 
generators (Bertram, Interview with Geoff Bertram 2015). Commentators believe that in 
instances where electricity can be generated for a low price such as 5c/kWh, the price paid for 
that electricity should be equal, or at least close, to it. The disagreement about the importance 
and accuracy of pricing mechanisms is an important touchstone in the debate on the role of the 
market in the electricity sector. 
 
Use of marginal pricing is not the only option available by which a market can operate. Some 
individuals have advocated for average pricing, whereby the unit charge is not what the next 
unit of electricity would cost; rather it is the average cost of the sources of electricity fed into 
that common pool. Taking the example from above, the average per kWh price would be 
approximately 8c/kWh. In the example above: marginal pricing is cheaper for customers than 
average price. This is not usually the case, as seen in markets that do have average pricing for 
electricity (Rassenti, Smith and Wilson 2003).  
 
Shane Dinnan, of NZX Energy, notes that what is typically the case is that support for marginal 
pricing or average pricing turns on whichever would be cheaper at a given time. He says, 
moreover, that in the long term the two pricing mechanisms should come “very close”, and an 
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efficient and competitive market will reflect that (Interview with Shane Dinnan 2014). The 
challenge he and others see is achieving that efficiency and competitiveness (Interview with 
Professor L. Evans 2014; Interview with Molly Melhuish 2014; Perspective 2014).  
 
An alternative to both marginal pricing and average pricing is what is called “Pay As You Bid” 
(PAUB) pricing. This is where the buyer actually does in essence “buy” the electricity from a 
particular generator, despite the fungible nature of the good. In a PAUB system, using the 
above three-generator example again: the electricity retailer will buy the first tranche of 
electricity at the lower price, and the second tranche – to meet demand – at the higher price. 
Some people support this model, and indeed on the surface it is appealing to customers, as it 
seems a fair system, where producers are paid in line with the marginal cost of what they are 
selling. The PAUB model, however, is unlikely to decrease the short-term price for wholesale 
electricity, will misalign incentives in the long- and short-term for investment, possibly 
decrease the efficiencies in electricity dispatch, and increase the barriers to entry for new 
market players (Tierney, Schatzki and Mukerji 2008; Kahn 2001; Cramton 2006; Newbery 
2002). The following explains these claims. 
 
Despite the its apparent complexity, and the appeal of a system where generators are paid at a 
lower rate, marginal pricing is important for three reasons. Firstly, it allows for efficient 
outcomes in the short term. In short, while electricity needs to be produced at the lowest 
economic cost, it needs to be consumed by those most willing to pay for it, and there should be 
no shortage or overproduction of electricity. A marginal price model better facilitates this.4  
Practically, when wholesalers know that the next unit of electricity will cost a certain amount, 
                                               
4 For more on this, see (Tierney, Schatzki and Mukerji 2008, 8). In short – the incentives under a PAUB model 
are different to those under a Marginal Pricing (MP) model. In the auction for electricity under MP, low-cost 
generators are incentivized to keep their prices that reflect the marginal cost of production and to not exceed that. 
The market clearing price is revealed when all generators and all consumers meet in the one auction space. If 
generators bid above their marginal price, there is a risk that they will attempt to charge too much, and the market 
will not clear (as no purchaser will be found). In a PAUB model, generators seek to maximize revenue through 
guessing what the market clearing price will be (Interview with Stephen Poletti 2015). They will try to pick an 
offer price that balances their chance of winning (by being at or below the offer price of the last bidder whose 
supplies are needed to meet customer demand) against the decreased profits from bidding a lower offer price. In 
short: companies will seek to guess what other companies will sell at; rather than deciding what is the most 
economic for their own companies. The overall market consequence of implementing this model, in the short 
term, is most likely not considerably different from the MP in price to consumers. However, in response to 
concerns identified by Bertram et al about delivering super-profits to generators: the PAUB model is likely to 
increase the margins many generators receive – especially those with low Long-Term Marginal-Cost structures. 
(Mount 2001; Abbink, Brandts and McDaniel 2003; Rassenti, Smith and Wilson 2003) 
29 
 
marginal pricing will allow them to turn on their more expensive generators as the real value 
of turning on their plant will be immediately realised.  
 
Secondly, marginal pricing prices at the long-term cost of additional generation of electricity. 
This pricing mechanism is important signalling to generators, as it allows them to better 
anticipate future revenue at differing levels of consumption; and makes the production of 
electricity – particularly at peak consumption times – economic.  
 
The cost of generation is more expensive when generation has a rising average cost of 
production – typical when supplying a peak demand period, facilitating a market that 
incentivises the lowest economic cost to supply that peak is fundamentally important. As with 
any good, long-term pricing under the average cost of production is economically unsustainable 
as it provides too little incentive to invest in new generation (Interview with Professor Lewis 
Evans 2014), but the generation of that electricity is necessary for New Zealand’s needs. A 
PAUB alternative also creates barriers to assurance of long term security of supply. The cost 
of forecasting for small generators is perceived by many to be too burdensome, further 
entrenching the established gentailers. Secondly, larger generators, with a more diversified 
fuel-base can better hedge against variations in the market clearing price: 
 
“Because pay-as-bid auctions create the incentive for all suppliers to bid the 
expected market-clearing price, rather than submitting bids reflecting each 
facility’s individual marginal costs, variation in bid prices within any given period 
is substantially reduced by a pay-as-bid auction.” (Tierney, Schatzki and Mukerji 
2008) 
 
This decrease in possible competition may lead to less pressure to push prices down to marginal 
costs owing to first principles of market competition. 
 
Thirdly, marginal pricing gives a price to the opportunity cost of the energy resource (Layton 
2013). This means that controllers of the energy resource – particularly of water – can know 
the cost of using their resource now, rather than in the future. This is important, as hydro-levels 
shift considerably over the course of a year, which is the largest factor in electricity price levels 
in New Zealand. In short: in summer, when levels are generally high, electricity is generally 
comparatively cheap as generators can rely on the cheap source of electricity; in winter, with 
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lower lake levels, other forms of power generation – notably natural gas – become more 
necessary to meet demand. Without accurate pricing signals, generators might provide “too 
much” cheap electricity to the market in times where lake levels are high. In doing so, they 
reduce their capacity to provide hydro power later in the year, increasing the cost of electricity 
to consumers at that point. This was seen in practice in 2002, where the operators of major 
hydroelectric power stations generated vast quantities of electricity in summer from the 
hydroelectric plants, which severely depleted the lake levels such that, come winter, prices 
were at an all-time high (NZX Energy 2014). Better understanding of the importance of pricing 
is said by some to have led to fewer instances of 2002’s price spikes (L. Evans 2014).  
 
1.3(c) Other cost components  
 
When a customer receives their power bill at the end of every month, they are quoted the price 
for electricity they have consumed in a given period, and are quoted a price for the availability 
of that electricity. Most people, when looking at the price that is quoted, assume that price is 
just for the power. It is for that reason that when complaints are made about the price for 
electricity, it is the retailers who bear the brunt of that anger. The reality, however, is that 
almost half of the cost for electricity comes not from the actual electricity, but rather the 
transmission and distribution of that power. Moreover, the Electricity Authority’s research 
leads them to believe as much as 72% of the increases in electricity prices in the past three 
years alone have come from this component of the cost (Gaffaney 2014). Additional key drivers 
include the increase in the price of natural gas from 2001 to 2008 of 95%. 
The transmission and distribution component of the above cost chart are highly regulated. Total 
transmission and distribution costs have increased by 4.5 percent in real terms since 2002, 
which is 0.6 percent per year on average (The Electricity Authority 2013). 
Retailers disagree with distribution and transmission companies as to who is to blame for 
increased prices. Speaking with representatives of both sides of the debate shows that the 
industry is divided: both in its appreciation of the problem, and in possible solutions. What is 
clear, though, is that there is a need for better data to resolve the debate – at least at a high, 
industry level. The early indications from the data are not positive for the distribution and 
transmission components. Despite this, the information that is received by most customers is 
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that the retailers are to blame. In Chapter 3 I will address this issue, and possible steps retailers 
could take to change the focus of pressure for change.  
Finally, the market governance component reflects the costs of the Electricity Authority and 
energy efficiency and consumer switching activities. Again, this price is regulated.  
One of the justifications for NZ Power has been that the price for electricity to a residential 
customer has increased out of step with the rest of the OECD. While promoting NZ Power, the 
Labour Party referred to the following graph regularly: 
 
It is important to note that, while the percentage change in New Zealand electricity prices seems 
marked, the statistics hide the reality that New Zealand customers face, in an international 
sense, relatively cheap prices for electricity, even for residential electricity use (Electricity 
Authority 2010). The most recent set that has comprehensive data for the OECD uses data from 
2010. From that dataset, New Zealand is below the OECD average (Energy Information 
Administration 2010; International Energy Agency 2009). Additionally, it is lower than other 
Figure 4: Percentage movement in electricity prices for OECD Nations from 1992 up to 2011. 
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nations with similarly significant reliance on hydroelectricity, including Sweden (Energy 
Supply Association of Australia 2012).  
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Appendix 1 
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While it is true there has been a considerable increase in the real price of electricity; the base 
price of that electricity – particularly for residential consumers – was very low. “The pricing 
of electricity was very political” Ralph Matthes says: “companies can’t vote but people can – 
so of course you would give cheaper prices to them” (Interview with Ralph Matthes of MEUG 
2014), referring to the pre-1990s price setting system.  Other people spoke to this same issue, 
where it was “common” for prices to be held low just before an election, then spiked up shortly 
after a new government was formed (Summary of Industry Representatives’ Comments, 2014). 
To be clearer: despite the notable increase in residential electricity prices over the past quarter 
century, the starting price was very low. This explains why the prices today are still low in an 
international sense.  
The price paid for electricity before the reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s was heavily 
subsidised by taxpayers, and in the case of residential customers: cross-subsidised by 
commercial and industrial users (Interview with Business New Zealand 2014). From a public 
policy perspective, questions have been asked about why there has been such a marked increase 
in price. Specifically, questions focussed on what the prices ought to be, considering the nature 
of electricity as a commodity, and the unique generation of it in New Zealand.  
Even ardent critics of the market believe prices are, for the large part, accurate reflections of 
the real marginal cost of electricity (Interview with Molly Melhuish 2014; Interview with 
Gareth Hughes MP 2014). What Hughes, Melhuish, and others believe, however, is that 
electricity is a special category of good in New Zealand – like healthcare or education – and 
like those goods, ideas of efficiency and market operations should take a definite back-seat to 
ideas of equity.  
Electricity is undoubtedly fundamental to the operation of modern life. Without it, perishable 
food cannot be stored long-term; lights cannot turn on; smartphones cannot charge. Some – 
like Bryan Leyland and Hughes – suggest it could be considered a special good, whose delivery 
to citizens should not be left to market forces as they currently exist to dictate supply, price, 
and other factors. The inference behind this view is that the state should heavily regulate or 
provide the electricity. Others, like Molly Melhuish call for a more simple removal of barriers 
to entry for non-electric alternatives. These positions beg the question of whether the state is 
capable of providing or facilitating abundant, secure, cheap electricity. When the government 
has had a reduced role in the market, history points to a greater security of supply. The history 
does show, at the same time, an increased price to (especially) residential consumers as the role 
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of government has reduced. The trade-off is clearly one that does not appeal to these 
commentators. That Labour and the Greens were not able to make political traction in the 
proposing of NZ Power  may suggest (although in no way definitively) that the electorate may 
be happy with the trade-off that has been made in this respect. As will be explored in Part 3, 
the lack of traction could also reflect that a large part of the voting public did not understand 
the NZ Power concept. On the idea that prices ought to be lower to reflect the relatively cheaper 
sources of generation, it is true that New Zealand’s generation system is one with a 
comparatively low long-run marginal cost (Interview with Electricity Authority 2014). It would 
seem that, from a political perspective, establishing this point, while at the same time showing 
that prices have increased, would be an effective weapon against the status quo. And indeed, 
the Labour and the Greens did try to run this line in support of the NZ Power proposal. The 
success of this strategy, however, was undermined by research by the Electricity Authority, 
which showed that the price of electricity in New Zealand – despite being “high” – was actually 
lower than the current long-run marginal cost of production (Electricity Authority 2014). This 
means that – while electricity prices may seem expensive – they are still too low to recover the 
cost of the initial investment, plus the ongoing running costs of production.  
In addition to this finding, the Labour and Greens arguments for NZ Power were focussed on 
other aspects of the industry they found problematic. A broader discussion of this can be found 
in Part 3.    
The numbers in Figures 4 and 5 are a reflection of the price increases observed, insofar as they 
reflect the stated price of electricity to residential customers, but according to the Electricity 
Authority, and to Gentailers, they might not reflect the true cost of electricity to residential 
customers because of hidden discounts which are not advertised, but do influence the price of 
electricity. As shown in Figure 6, research by the Authority and MBIE (Electricity Authority 
2014) suggests that prices have increased over the past decade, but not uniformly, or to the 
extent the above figures might suggest (MBIE 2014). The data is limited to price information 
collected by the government, which goes back as far as 2002:  
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Of particular note is the slowing rate of growth since 2011. As noted on the chart, this coincides 
with two steps undertaken by the Authority to increase competition in the sector. The first 
measure was the beginning of the “What’s My Number” campaign, which sought to increase 
the information available to consumers as to which retailer would provide them with the 
cheapest power prices. The Authority believes that this programme – as well as more general 
increases in awareness of power prices – has increased the level of consumer awareness, 
potentially saving customers almost $170 million as of August 2015 (Electricity Authority - 
What's My Number 2014). However, others believe the impact has been more muted:  
Electricity firms don't bother trying to compete on price and differentiate 
themselves with puffery like Newsboy and energy conscious pukekos; thank 
heavens the Government is here to help. (Grant 2014) 
The other action taken was a Virtual Asset Swap (VAS) between Meridian Energy, Contact 
Energy, and Mighty River Power. Meridian Energy had little generation capacity in the North 
Island, and MRP and Contact Energy had limited generation capacity in the South Island.  
It was perceived that this led to limited competition between the retailers:  
The virtual asset swaps provide a more stable wholesale purchase price for 
retailers in the island where they have little or no generation, thereby 
Figure 6: Inflation-adjusted price increases in electricity. 
100.00
105.00
110.00
115.00
120.00
125.00
130.00
135.00
140.00
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
C
h
an
ge
s 
in
 p
ri
ce
 (2
00
2 
as
 b
as
e 
ye
ar
)
Real residential cost per unit (including GST)
36 
 
encouraging additional retail competition in both islands. The virtual asset 
swaps have ramp-up and ramp-down volumes to avoid abrupt changes to 
retail portfolios. (New Zealand Government 2010) 
The VAS was functionally a long-term hedge contract as described above. Actual ownership 
of the plants did not change, but companies were compelled to give a set amount of MWh to 
their competitors from set plants, at prices agreed to and set by MBIE. As noted before, this 
allows those who purchase the electricity to have control over it – as if they actually controlled 
the power plant. Functionally, this increases the competition in a given area. It is difficult for a 
power plant in the south of the South Island to provide electricity to Auckland, primarily as the 
losses in the lines are substantial, and too little electricity will reach customers for it to be worth 
the cost. Before the VAS, Meridian generated most of the electricity needed for the South 
Island; and Contact had considerable market share for the North Island – stifling competition. 
Increasing the distribution of each company’s generation capacity across New Zealand 
increased the competition between electricity wholesalers.  
Either the asset swap, or the “What’s My Number” campaign, or both of these measures seems 
to have had a measurable impact on prices for consumers in the past three years. Price has 
increased over the past 30 years since the growing role of the market in the electricity sector. 
The rate of growth, however, has slowed in recent years. Between 2004 and 2008, the average 
annual rate of growth was 5.4%; from 2009 to 2013 this had dropped to an annual growth rate 
of 3.3%. There is insufficient evidence to conclude whether this downturn in price was affected 
by the Global Financial Crisis.  
1.4 The NZ Power Proposal  
 
The Wolak report to the Commerce Commission on the activities of electricity gentailers in the 
New Zealand electricity market described a series of abuses of market power by gentailers that 
allowed for $4.3 billion in rents being taken from consumers over the previous six and a half 
years (F. A. Wolak 2009). To stop the gentailers from generating super profits at the expense 
of consumers, the Labour and the Green parties released the NZ Power proposal in April of 
2013. 
NZ Power is a complex proposal. It is not, as some commentators have suggested, a pure single-
buyer model in the style of Pharmac; nor is it (at least not immediately) a “re-nationalisation” 
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of the sector as some opponents have framed it. Nor is it in fact just one proposal. The first 
notable aspect of the NZ Power proposal is that, even though most people understood that the 
proposal was a major joint policy by the Labour and Green parties in New Zealand, or at least 
two very similar proposals, it was, in fact, two discrete and sometimes distinct policies that 
sought to achieve mostly overlapping yet sometimes different goals. Nevertheless, there was 
sufficient overlap of policy objectives to allow this analysis to refer to them as essentially one 
proposal, with a common name. After all, the two parties felt comfortable launching the ‘policy 
proposal’ at the same press conference. 
This section will address the major goals, and their various implications. What is consistent 
across both versions of the proposal, however, is that NZ Power sought to roll back many of 
the market developments currently seen in the sector, and give greater emphasis to concepts of 
equity for consumers. 
The proposal’s (common) core elements seek to minimise prices through three mechanisms. 
First, NZ Power would capitalise on the leverage one large buyer can have in the market place, 
and on behalf of New Zealand residential consumers, bulk-purchase the first 300kWh of 
electricity each household consumes in a month – or 3,600 kWh per annum. NZ Power would 
then, through its retail function, sell that electricity to residential consumers. According to the 
Electricity Authority, a typical household consumes 8,000 kWh, so NZ Power would be 
responsible for 45% of a typical household’s power consumption ceteris paribus. This 
mechanism responds to the concern that individual residential consumers have less bargaining 
power than larger commercial or industrial consumers. The threshold of 300 kWh has been 
vaguely justified on the grounds that marginal pricing should continue to have a role in 
incentivising future investment in the industry. The body established by NZ Power would also 
replace the functions currently carried out by the Electricity Authority (New Zealand Labour 
Party 2013). Figure 7 offers an adapted version of Figure 1 from earlier in this chapter on how 
NZ Power would affect the sector’s structure. 
Second, the government would engage with investors who would tender to produce new 
generation capacity in New Zealand. The government would sign long-term agreements for 
supply, with fixed prices for that electricity. The Labour spokesman David Parker believed that 
this was economically viable, as it would allow actors to enter the market who had until that 
point faced too high barriers to entry from the established gentailers. The barriers would be 
lowered as potential entrants could be assured of their future revenue, and at the same time the 
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government could use its market position to ensure an economical price for that capacity 
(Interview with the Hon. Dr David Parker 2014).  
 
 
 
Third, and this was a component only included in Labour’s proposal, the body established by 
NZ Power would be empowered to set the price at which electricity is purchased in the retail 
market, so consumers would pay a price for electricity that reflects the marginal cost of 
Figure 1.3: simplified version of New Zealand’s electricity market structure. The position 
that NZ Power proposal would have added to the current sector structure is shown. Note: 
only major generators and retailers are shown, and only three distribution companies listed.  
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production. The full mechanism for this was not released, so the long-term consequences of 
these investment incentives, and the role of marginal pricing, is still to be established. 
David Parker is widely regarded as the author of the NZ Power proposal (Interview with Brian 
Fallow 2014). In 2006, there was a review of the state of the electricity sector, and David Parker 
was, at the time, Minister for Energy. A single-buyer model was one of the proposals for change 
that were considered, alongside refining the market as it currently stands (Interview with the 
Hon. Dr David Parker 2014). The second key goal was one that was driven largely by Parker, 
and it sought to put a price on the use of water. Parker’s contention was that water should be a 
public good, and its use should either create benefit to the public, or its users should pay to use 
it. Pricing water would seek to ensure that a public good’s private benefit was transferred to 
the public. In short, because of the pricing mechanism established by a future NZ Power-
empowered body, the monopoly rents that Parker and others believe users of water were 
enjoying would be stripped away through paying generators the marginal cost of production 
for that fuel source, rather than at the wider industry marginal cost price.  
The two goals seek to radically redesign the underlying mechanism of the New Zealand 
electricity sector. But more than that: it seeks to redesign the underlying premise of the sector; 
away from viewing electricity as any other commodity, and reverting it to something akin to 
the public good it was once considered. The success of the proposal is assessed in Part 3. Its 
success will be assessed against the frameworks established in Chapter 2, namely 
governmentality and policy incrementalism.  
What Chapter 1 has shown is how the electricity market system New Zealand operates, and the 
path of legislative and regulatory changes that led to it. It built upon the literature available on 
the sector, and added some findings from research conducted in the production of this thesis. 
In short: New Zealand has a highly developed market structure, with mature market products 
used by a range of established, and fledgling, market players. While prices have increased in 
the time since deregulation, the Electricity Authority believes that these prices are yet to reflect 
the true cost of production. The Authority does not comment as to whether it believes prices 
should – or will – rise in the future. At the same time the Authority sees the market as 
competitive. Others disagree, and NZ Power arose from a scepticism about the level of 
competition in what is clearly an oligopolistic market. 
The next chapter is a review of literature on public policy development. First, it seeks to identify 
the literature analysing the process of policy reform, and the nature of the discourse 
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surrounding reforms and their communication. The relevant literature is grouped around the 
two broad themes of governmentality and policy change through incremental reform. Second, 
it will build on the meagre literature on policy reform of the electricity market in New Zealand, 
and notes that there is a gap in the literature relating to debate over electricity policy reform in 
NZ. Finally, Chapter 2 will identify the key elements of a framework with which the debate 
over the NZ Power proposal can be analysed. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
This review first addresses how laws are changed in a very general sense. It draws upon 
domestic and international literature on the law change, and policy development, process. It 
then seeks to drive deeper into policy development, and to ask why particular policies come 
about. Specifically applied to this thesis, the view draws upon governmentality and policy 
incrementalism literature to help better understand policy development in the sector. These two 
framing tools hope to illuminate what competing interests intersect to generate the political and 
economic conditions we see in that sector. Through investigating the economic interests at 
play, we can begin to understand the current status of the sector and, moreover, suggest how 
future policies might be received by different actors. We can then assess the frameworks 
adopted in public communications about the proposal, and the communicative strategies we 
see in the debate on the proposal. 
2.1 Broad literature on law change  
 
It can be argued that there is a typical process by which ideas for policy reform are created, and 
the reforms implemented. New Zealand’s leading legal textbook, The New Zealand Legal 
System: Structures and Processes (Morag MacDowell 2006) outlines these steps: 
 
 
Identify a 
need
Identify 
options:
•Identify policy 
goals
•Identify 
stakeholder
•Identify intended 
outcomes
Propose 
reform to 
Parliament
Have 
successful 
readings 
through 
Parliament
Figure 8: Simplified path of a bill’s journey to becoming law (Morag MacDowell 2006). 
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While technically a correct description of the law change process, these steps are an unrealistic 
overview of policy change: the reality of any policy change is far more chaotic, and reflects 
the complex interactions between stakeholders at each stage. While it is true that there is a 
prescribed process through which legislation must pass to become law, the intricacies of each 
stage, and indeed the success which proposals have or do not have at each stage, are far less 
clear.  
Adger and others (W Neil Adger 2003) suggest that any regulatory or legislative change on 
environmental policy issues is “likely to be the product of a particular configuration of 
institutions (that is, both formal and informal), scale (whether it is local, national, or global), 
and cultural and historical context”. So that, while in theory MacDowell’s four steps will be 
followed, the practical implementation of the stages will be more complex and contingent on 
institutional and other pre-requisites. Adger described environmental policy change as “thick” 
decision making: he saw a multi-disciplinary approach which conceptualised four key 
questions of policy across the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of 
development. These questions involved economic efficiency, environmental effectiveness, 
equity, and political legitimacy. In short, Adger suggests that the development of policy is not 
a simple matter of an individual proposing legislation, and that then being enacted. Rather, 
policy generally must meet hurdles of efficiency, effectiveness, legitimacy and so on; and there 
are different views and concerns interacting – sometimes competitively, and other times to 
mutual benefit –throughout all stages of policy development. 
What this means, in practical terms, for policy development, is that a more realistic appreciation 
of the context of law or regulatory changes is needed, and this context reflects various 
stakeholders’ view of efficiency, legitimacy, and so on.  For this reason, an important 
component of this thesis seeks to understand the different stakeholders and their views that 
affect policy development – in short, this research project seeks to gain a ‘thick’ understanding 
of electricity sector decision making in New Zealand. 
Current literature on electricity policy change covers a number of these stages. Bertram’s 
chapter in Electricity Market Reform, for instance, offers a précis of the policy changes in New 
Zealand between 1994 and 2005. Bertram suggests that the drive for “efficient” pricing 
underpinned most of the changes that were observed in the sector – especially in the context of 
wider economic reforms in the direction of a greater role for market-based ideas.  (Bertram 
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2006) Additionally, organisations such as NZX Energy in their teaching material (NZX Energy 
2009), and the Electricity Authority in their public statements (Hansen 2014) offer additional 
– if conflicting – overviews of their position on the outcomes of successive reforms. The 
variation in position taken on the reforms, and the justifications for them, speak in large part to 
the themes of literature that will be addressed below – specifically those of governmentality, 
and policy incrementalism.   
Various groups, such as political parties (New Zealand Labour Party 2013), and academics (L. 
Evans 2014; Bertram 2013) give grounding in terms of the need for past reform, and the 
necessity for future reform. The question here is what they have emphasised, and how that 
feeds into an emerging framework for assessing policy development within the sector. This 
will be developed now.  
 
2.2 On how policy evolves 
 
2.2(a) Governmentality, framing and communication 
 
Governmentality is a concept created by Michel Foucault that seeks to understand the 
institutions and procedures that allow for the exercise of power. Attempting to explain the “art 
of governing”, governmentality examines how individuals, communities, interest groups, and 
nations can be shaped by public policies and the operation of government, and how 
governments can use knowledge about the electorate to effect policy change. Of particular note, 
governmentality seeks to examine the role that a neoliberal paradigm plays in modern 
governance, and how leaders use framing to achieve policy ends. 
Governmentality also seeks to analyse how governments use established networks to make 
policy change. Understanding how a stakeholder or interest group might respond to a given 
action by government increases the ability of the state to govern, as outcomes and success can 
be anticipated. 
There is debate on the legitimacy of the use of the word neoliberal. It is typical that those who 
would be considered neoliberal reject that label as being insufficiently (or indeed: 
misleadingly) descriptive of their views. In a New Zealand context, for instance, one of the 
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longest standing and respected advocate for “neoliberal” views is the late Roger Kerr, the 
former head of the New Zealand Business Roundtable. On the term, Kerr said “I have struggled 
to fathom its origin and meaning” (R. Kerr 2002). To answer Kerr is Milton Friedman. The 
conception of neoliberalism Friedman envisaged was a society that “must give high place to a 
severe limitation on the power of the state to interfere in the detailed activities of individuals; 
at the same time, it must explicitly recognize that there are important positive functions that 
must be performed by the state” (Friedman, Neo-Liberalism and its Prospects 1951). Rather 
than simply being a construct that seeks to limit the role of the state, neoliberal ideals seek to 
maximise the liberty of the individual. Friedman, in later years, described himself as a liberal, 
and came to criticise the neoliberal policies enacted as “develop[ing] machinery that would 
make possible a government that I would come to criticize severely as too large, too intrusive, 
too destructive of freedom.” (Friedman and Friedman 1998). The governmentality conception 
of neoliberalism is similar (Protevi 2009; Cotoi 2011). For the purposes of clarity, this thesis 
will broadly consider the rise of an emphasis on market forces in New Zealand as an expression 
of the development of neoliberalism – even if it is a title unappreciated by some. 
Nisbet used governmentality concepts to analyse the state of the discussion of climate change 
in the USA (Nisbet 2009). He illustrated how, while it is important to have clear policy 
objectives, it is even more important to understand how to implement that policy in the relevant 
political environment. For instance, Nisbet noted that “Although the Obama administration is 
committed to addressing climate change, the necessary level of public engagement with the 
issue still appears to be missing” (Nisbet 2009, 14). Nisbet’s analysis was premised almost 
explicitly upon governmentality concepts that seek to explain why the implementation of 
policy initiatives fail or succeed. He did this through analysing the framing and communication 
of the proposals – the communication of both the impetus for change, and the impact of 
particular policies. In this article, Nisbet showed that the framing of the debate at that stage had 
failed to effect the change the policy makers sought.  
Hickman builds on these themes in his investigation into changing commuter’s behaviours in 
Auckland, to prioritise public transport over personal car use (Hickman, Austin and Banister 
2014). He notes that embedded processes generate their own inertia; with particular framing 
making “[some] elements seem fixed others inappropriate”. Hickman suggests that the only 
way to see progress towards the policy goals he and others support is to push for a redefinition 
of established frames; and refocussing on others – in this instance environmental concerns and 
social equity. 
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Tapping into and articulating public concerns are critical for policy reform. A Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC 2012) report analysed public attitudes towards a number 
of energy-related issues. The report explicitly grappled with public opinion, what guides it, and 
what can effect change to entrenched positionality within a populace. It found, in brief, that 
when asked what concerns respondents, very few responded with climate and environmental 
issues. However, when asked directly, energy security was a matter for concern for around half 
of respondents. What this highlights is that the framing of particular concerns and policy issues 
can directly affect how they are perceived within the electorate, and how policy can be formed 
to respond to those concerns. For instance, when questions focused on potentially sharp 
increases in electricity prices, or a need for greater dependence on renewable sources of energy, 
there was a far greater positive response from respondents. Another example is Myers et al, 
whose 2012 paper speaks to the difficulty of engaging the public in discussions of climate 
change. The study shows that a given framing will elicit a different response from the public: 
framing climate change as a national security issue was likely to result in some antipathy 
towards mitigation of climate change; framing climate change as one affecting health concerns 
resulted in greater levels of support for action (Myers, et al. 2012).  
In rather verbose and colourful language, Rutland builds on this literature with an appraisal of 
the City of Portland’s response to climate change issues (Rutland and Aylett 2008). “However, 
in specific constellations of power in which state objectives require behaviour change and 
where the use of force (legislative or physical) is deemed politically or ethically untenable, 
governmentality may prove to be a productive approach to analysing state actions”. It seems 
that Rutland is trying to show how governmentality can be used to gain an holistic 
understanding of the way policy develops and is implemented. Specifically applied here, this 
framing of governmentality speaks to the broader point of this study, whereby we seek to show 
that the development of the sector as it is today did not come from a vacuum; but rather a 
developing and realised policy base, and one which has had a good measure of public support.  
Policy makers can learn from this to see how buy-in for particular policy changes can be 
formed. Similarly, they can project the impact of a communication strategy. This has particular 
application to this study, as the framing of issues such as fuel poverty are central to a view on 
NZ Power. 
A US psychologist, Weber, describes how perceptions of climate change are formed. Weber 
describes the relationships between various stakeholders, and how these impact upon policy 
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outcomes. In this instance, the perceptions of climate change arise from interactions with 
‘things’ – such as weather phenomena – and with people, their views, and their science (Weber 
2010). People have learned of climate change from personal experience and from statistics, and 
these stimuli result in affect-based and analysis-based decisions. Applied to the context of this 
thesis, these ‘things’ may include the price of electricity, issues of carbon intensity, and prior 
views about the role government should play in the sector.  
Hoffman sought in part to describe the way in which particular positions on climate change are 
subscribed to by individuals. The author did this by examining the media and debate to which 
individuals and groups are exposed (Hoffman 2011). The framework is similar in some respects 
to Weber’s approach, in the sense that it builds on the understanding of interactive processes 
which determine the scope for governmentality: stakeholders form positions based upon the 
position and behaviour of various other actors, both in the sense of what those different actors 
believe, but also in the way those actors interact with others. 
Applied to this particular research, it is important to understand which stakeholders have a 
position of influence, and the historic basis for such a position, before we can fully understand 
the influence they wield. The ability of government to use those actors and networks is 
important to understanding the workings of governmentality. 
Experts are particular stakeholders. The use of experts, and their ability to influence discussion 
is fundamental to aspects of governmentality. Research by Johnston and Ballard indicate that 
there are “meaningful changes in public opinion in the direction of expert consensus when 
citizens are given explicit information about expert opinion” (Johnston and Ballard 2014). The 
sometimes high-level discussions that are associated with policy decisions can often be out of 
reach of many in the electorate. Government actors can exploit that informational gap, and 
effect policy that few understand, sometimes by citing or appealing to experts understood by 
only a few. Johnston and Ballard indicate that this is possible as “that exposure to highly 
technical, means-oriented issues makes one’s lack of knowledge salient, and perhaps engenders 
greater respect for experts” (Johnston and Ballard 2014, 26). The New Zealand electricity 
sector – particularly around pricing mechanisms – is very complex.  
Crafting discourse in such a way as to keep that policy discussion at a high level could give 
greater control to privileged academic or industry perspectives, a stratum in which there are 
few dissident voices.  
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The investigation in the following chapters will speak to the applicability of this research for 
the energy sector. Specifically the idea explored is that reducing the degree of technical 
complexity in the discourse on public policy can increase buy-in from the wider electorate, and 
thus can provide for more representative policy development. 
For the purposes of this study, governmentality can illuminate how governments seek to 
become aware of the various actors and networks in play, so as to best know what policy 
concerns can be allowed and what reforms can be advanced or resisted at a given time, and 
what can plausibly be achieved through policy. Governmentality can provide insight into how 
particular reforms have been successfully implemented – and by corollary those that have not 
been successful – including how such reforms can be cast in a positive light.  
The history of reform in a range of sectors in New Zealand suggests that not all policies 
proposed for reform have been accepted by the electorate, whereas others have. For example, 
the proposed flat tax reforms of Roger Douglas in the late 1980s are an instance where the 
reforms stalled as the pragmatism of New Zealanders led to increasing scepticism about the 
market ideology driving the reforms (Brooking 2004). This is despite the fact that the Lange 
Government had already implemented considerable supply-side reforms in the period leading 
up to this proposal. The particulars of this example – that Lange had to eventually fire Douglas 
in order to stop the proposal – speaks to the idea that policies, whether or not they are good 
ones, cannot be enacted carte blanche by a government seeking reform. 
The delineation between successfully implemented policies and unsuccessful ones may be able 
to be ascribed to the success of governments in mastering the principles behind 
governmentality.  
In addition to the nature of the broad mechanisms by which state institutions govern, some 
writers on governmentality are also concerned with the role of neoliberalism in the 
development of policy. Neoliberalism, in the context in which Foucault originally discussed 
governmentality, spoke to two concepts: first, the continued devolving of power within a state 
to individuals; and second, the increasing role market forces have within policy making (Gupta 
2002). Neoliberal governmentality offers a critique of the tools used by governors to effect 
policy, with particular regard to the diminishing role of the state coinciding with the increased 
relevance and power of the market (Lemke 2002). The history of the past 30 years of public 
policy in New Zealand has been one of the increased role of markets, and the relatively 
diminished role of government. The reforms of the Fourth Labour Government (1984-1990) 
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began a process for public policy in New Zealand that, in most facets of society, continues to 
this day. This is particularly true as regards the New Zealand electricity sector. As discussed 
above, the sector has been transformed into one that is heavily dependent upon the effective 
operation of market forces, and is only lightly regulated. NZ Power represents a challenge to 
the established role of markets within the electricity sector – it would explicitly remove a 
considerable portion of the pricing mechanism which generators and retailers use to trade 
electricity. 
The purpose of this thesis is to better understand the debate and discourse that surrounds policy 
reform within the electricity sector. The framework of governmentality is of particular value 
for this thesis. The specific lens of neoliberal governmentality can be used to better examine 
the progressive rise of the market in the New Zealand policy context, and critique this 
progression. The tools provided by governmentality help to interrogate the intentions and 
actions of stakeholders within the reform process to better understand why past reforms 
happened. We can also use the knowledge gained about the framing and political “selling” of 
the idea for the implementation and understanding of future reform.  
The questions, introduced in the next chapter, put to individual stakeholders in this research 
study seek to better understand how they believe the reform process has been enacted in the 
past. Understanding the drivers of policy reform (both stated and unstated) gives greater insight 
into the reform process than simply reading Hansard, or a chronology of legislation and 
regulation. By seeking industry, political, and academic insight into future reform, a sense of 
the processes through which reformers are likely to act can provide direction as to the future 
of reforms. Drawing themes from those discussions gives a better understanding of the role of 
markets and of government in the sector; and in so doing, it can speak to the claims that 
underpin governmentality – of how policy manifests.  
On Frameworks and Cognitive Linguistics  
 
Discussions on frameworks intersect with governmentality. Successful governing, according 
to both framing and governmentality writings, requires the governors to identify issues, and 
then construct a narrative around those issues to position them in a way that makes acceptance 
of the problem – or usually, of the proposed solution – more likely. Put another way, successful 
governing requires policy makers to convince people that there is an issue in need of resolving, 
and that their proposal is the best resolution to the problem. It does this by presenting the nature 
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of the problem in a way that is both believable, but also tailored in a way that lends itself 
immediately to the solution proposed. (Barr, Gilg and Shaw 2011) Through speeches, 
education, and campaigns, framing allows for leaders to control the discourse on issues. 
(Lakoff 2010) 
Building on the literature surrounding governmentality, and that on the Overton Window 
(discussed below), it is evident that framing is important. For example, efficiency tends to be 
framed in the New Zealand discourse as essential for sound policy, and is strongly associated 
with economic growth, emphasised by both major parties, but particularly successive National 
governments. Equity is clearly much more emphasised by Labour governments, particularly 
the Fifth Labour government (1999-2008), but – consistent with the Overton window – rapid 
changes in perceived equity of policies are unlikely to be acceptable.  
The main points of emphasis in the discourse around the electricity sector have been issues of 
price (or to some, equity); security of supply; and environmental concerns. As discussed in 
chapter 1, prior to 1984, the government was responsible for the provision of electricity. The 
concern for them at that point was to ensure the security of supply, and – to a lesser extent – 
ensure prices were ‘affordable’. Then, once the Fourth Labour Government took control, there 
was a shift – led by Roger Douglas, Richard Prebble, and the Treasury – to have greater concern 
for return on government investment, i.e. ‘efficiency’ in resource allocation. In short, 
provisions such as the State Owned Enterprises Act of 1986 empowered government 
institutions to act as if they were private organisations – needing to generate a return for their 
stockholder (at this point, the government). This shift in the way the sector was viewed by 
policy makers added prices as a second driver for the sector. Finally, with concerns surrounding 
the environmental impact flowing from the large-scale developments such as the Clyde Dam, 
broader NIMBY concerns from the electorate, and more recently climate change concerns, 
environmental impacts – in the broadest sense – have also moved to the fore. Policy makers, 
and those with influence within the sector outside policy circles, have been affected by these 
key frames. The impact of those frames on discourse and the ability to develop the sector is 
explored further in the next section, and in Part 3.  
2.2(b) Policy Incrementalism and the Overton Window 
 
The current state of the New Zealand electricity sector has evolved over 30 years into its present 
state. This change has, as discussed earlier in this thesis, been characterised by several material 
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changes over this time period. The sort of policy change that happens in a progressive manner 
is sometimes referred to as policy incrementalism (Lindblom 1979; Bevir 2007).  In short, 
policy incrementalism refers to the process by which a larger shift in government approach is 
achieved through a number of smaller shifts in a particular direction (M. T. Hayes 2006). One 
of the key reasons for this approach to policy development is that it allows for the trial of new 
policy arrangements in a given sector, which – owing to their relatively small deviation from 
the previous setup – can be wound back should the change lead to adverse outcomes. Indeed, 
in the New Zealand electricity sector, some of the reforms have been wound back, as the 
implications for consumers were found to be negative. For instance, the ability of the Electricity 
Commission to properly oversee the sector was found to be lacking, due to the very wide scope 
the Commission was given, and some overlap with other agencies such as EECA. This led to 
many of the responsibilities of the Commission – including managing energy efficiency and 
oversight of the market maker –either being stripped from the Commission, or changed in 
scope. The Commission’s name was eventually changed to the current ‘Electricity Authority’. 
This progressive, almost ad hoc approach to changing the sector is advantageous in a situation 
where there are possibilities for change to the sector, but the exact mechanism which can lead 
to better outcomes is not clear (Yanarella and Bartilow 2000; Pralle 2009). 
Alternatively, policy incrementalism can be adopted by policy makers in order to slowly but 
strategically change a given sector while maintaining support within the electorate. This 
realpolitik appreciation of the limitations on the power of government, and the need to slowly 
move policy within the acceptable limits of the electorate is sometimes referred to as the 
Overton Window. The Window imagines the decisions available to policy makers as existing 
on a spectrum which represents all of the possible policy choices for a given issue. While for 
many public policy issues there is a wide range of possible policy solutions, the Overton 
Window suggests that only a small number of those choices are available at any one time to 
policy makers. Overton suggests that radical change is, for the large part, very difficult for 
policy makers to implement, and rather, change will be far more progressive – even piecemeal 
– in order to be successfully implemented (Russell 2006). This is because politicians are self-
interested, and want to get re-elected, and should they implement something outside what the 
electorate considers to be acceptable, they will reduce their chances of being re-elected. The 
majority of the public do not appreciate significant change to the status quo – especially in 
areas of policy that directly impact upon their lives (like education, health, or energy), as their 
lives have been planned around the previous rules.  
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Figure 9 offers a simplified, applied version of the Overton Window, and suggests there is a 
range of different structures the industry could take. While Figure 9 is displayed with greater 
government control on the left, and lower government control on the right, this is purely for 
formatting reasons, rather than as a reflection of the right/left divide in political discourse.  
Government 
controls means of 
production and 
sale; consumption 
sometimes rationed 
Government allows 
only a few market 
competitors, 
approves rates, 
protects monopoly 
energy suppliers, 
provides subsidies 
Energy firms 
regulated; 
particular energy 
sources subsidized 
to limited extent 
Government 
monitors open 
competition in 
energy market, 
energy firms 
somewhat 
regulated; no 
subsidies 
No government 
ownership, control 
or monitoring of 
energy markets 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
  
New Zealand’s electricity sector sits around 4 in Figure 2. In 1980, the sector in New Zealand 
sat around number 1. The reforms of the late 1980s did not immediately shift New Zealand 
from 1 to 4; rather it slowly saw a shift to the right on that continuum over years of successive 
pro-market reforms. The Overton Window political theory would suggest the slowness of the 
shift was not for want of policy direction on the part of individual, pro-market politicians and 
other stakeholders, but rather a lack of perceived political feasibility to radically shift the sector 
in a short period of time. This in turn reflected substantial pressure to retain government 
involvement, and a broader scepticism about market competition. 
NZ Power would represent a shift to the left on the above spectrum. It seeks to set prices, and 
to curtail the market power individual retailers have in the market. The relative success or 
failure of the proposal could speak to the legitimacy of the Overton Window theory: if the 
electorate is accustomed to sitting at position 4, as they seem to be at present, and the ability 
of proponents to shift policy either left along the spectrum is limited, then we might expect to 
see significant resistance to a shift significantly leftward, if the theory has legitimacy. 
Figure 9: Worked example of the steps in policy progression in the 
electricity sector 
Greater market 
role 
Greater 
government role 
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The Overton Window theory is used to frame part of Chapter 5’s discussion on the debate over 
electricity policy in New Zealand. Overton suggests that there is a spectrum or “degree of 
acceptance” for policy ideas, ranking over time through the following stages (Atkins 2006): 
 Unthinkable 
 Radical 
 Acceptable 
 Sensible 
 Popular 
 Policy 
Politicians and other stakeholders who seek to shape policy need to shift the public discourse 
on a topic in order to actually implement that policy. Part 3 in this study seeks to investigate 
whether key stakeholders and individuals are able to craft discourse, and explores examples of 
how this has actually been done.   
Free market policies have become de rigueur in many OECD nations over the past 30 years. 
This recent (2014) general election, and the policies offered by left-leaning parties during the 
election, sought to halt or reverse that trend, particularly in the electricity sector. If the Overton 
Window theory holds, it would suggest that effecting such a leftward change is difficult.    
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Part B: An explanation of methodology and sampling  
Chapter 3: Methodology and Research Questions 
3.1 Location  
 
This research was based in Wellington, with scope available for travel that allowed meeting 
with stakeholders and experts. The choice in location was justified on the grounds that 
Wellington is the location where the head offices of most of the relevant parties are located. 
This thesis has involved key market players to see what they would predict to be the 
consequences of NZ Power if it were implemented. Beginning with the gentailers themselves: 
privately owned gentailers such as Contact Energy, and (part)-publicly owned gentailers such 
as Meridian Energy are headquartered in Wellington. Speaking with them was a necessity, and 
was possible within a Wellington context. More broadly, prominent business groups such as 
Business New Zealand, who have already expressed an opinion on NZ Power were important 
to meet with, and are accessible in Wellington. 
This thesis has engaged politicians on the issue – both proponents and opponents of the policy. 
Again, Wellington was the relevant location as the capital. Speaking with the crafters of the 
proposed policy, i.e. Gareth Hughes MP, and Hon. David Parker, was important for 
understanding the political context from which the policy originates, and the intended impact. 
Speaking with Members who took a position against the proposal gave a fuller understanding 
of the political dimension of the proposal. 
Finally, experts such as Dr Geoff Bertram and Prof Lew Evans are Wellington-based. Gleaning 
from them their own analysis of the New Zealand electricity market was important for adding 
depth and context to my research. While other experts, like Dr Stephen Poletti, are not based 
in Wellington, they were accessible at minimal travel cost.  
  
3.2 Why a qualitative approach?  
 
The emphasis on discourse in this study required a largely qualitative approach – with some 
quantitative analysis to supplement parts of it. Qualitative research is concerned with 
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developing explanations of social phenomena. It goes beyond simply discovering the state of 
something, in this instance the electricity sector, and provides tools to understand why the 
sector is arranged as it is, how people perceive the sector, and how people believe change can 
be effected within the sector. (Hancock B. 2009).  
Building on this is critical qualitative research, which provides tools to investigate whose 
interests are being served by the current structure of the system, or by any proposed changes to 
the current system. (Merriam 2002) Applied to this research, a more critical approach to 
qualitative research was appropriate, as I sought to understand the justifications behind policy 
changes. 
Quantitative analysis has a limited but still valid role to play in this research. Quantitative 
analysis uses statistical techniques that illustrate broader trends and positions on a particular 
issue. Applied to this research, my chosen approach examined media reporting on the 
electricity sector, and extracted trends from the data.  
This research involved interviews with parties who would have been affected by NZ Power, as 
well as experts who do not have a direct interest. Meeting with the range of aforementioned 
parties ensured that a range of perspectives are understood. A wider range of viewpoints 
increased the legitimacy of conclusions formed from this research. A qualitative approach is 
appropriate as the purpose of this investigation is to better understand the environment within 
which energy policy is formulated and implemented. The study has essentially been qualitative.  
Semi-structured interviews was the appropriate way of discussing in-depth the issues relevant 
to this research with all stakeholders. Understanding both the economic theory and the political 
reality was important to this research. 
  
3.3 How samples are developed 
 
The complete set of people and organisations whom this research engaged is listed in Table 3 
below. : 
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Organisation or Individual Category 
Lew Evans Academic 
Stephen Poletti Academic 
Geoff Bertram Academic 
John Carnegie of Business New 
Zealand 
Business sector / consumer advocate 
Ralph Matthes of the Major 
Electricity Users Group 
Consumer advocate 
Molly Melhuish Consumer advocate 
Bryan Leyland Consumer advocate 
Dominic Milicich of The Treasury Government department 
Gareth Wilson of the Ministry of 
Business, Innovation and 
Employment 
Government department 
James Flanner of Contact Energy Industry/gentailer 
Nick Wilson of Mighty River Power Industry/gentailer 
Dr Andrew Kerr and Alannah 
MacShane of Meridian Energy 
Industry/gentailer 
Paul Baker of Nova Energy Industry/gentailer 
James Tipping of Trustpower Industry/gentailer 
Graeme Everett of Norske Skogg Major user 
Shane Dinnan of NZX Energy Market clearer/data providers 
John Rampton of the Electricity 
Authority 
Market Regulator 
Consumer Magazine Media 
Brian Fallow of the New Zealand 
Herald 
Media 
Hon. David Parker Politician (Labour minister) 
Hon. David Caygill Politician (Labour minister) 
Hon. Max Bradford Politician (National minister) 
Hon. Simon Bridges Politician (National minister) 
Gareth Hughes MP Politician (Green MP) 
Ross Parry of Transpower Transmission/market operator 
 
 
As noted, these organisations or people can be categorised into a number of groups: 
representatives from the sector, including gentailers and Transpower; politicians, academics, 
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media representatives, and consumer/business advocates. These people were chosen in an 
attempt to get as wide a set of informed views as possible on the sector, and policy development 
within.  
 
3.4 The role of thematic analysis 
 
A thematic analysis approach is used for drawing out the important patterns of discourse and 
hence the conclusions in this thesis. Thematic analysis is considered by many to be the 
“foundational method” for qualitative analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006), and allows for the 
examination of particular dominant themes arising from qualitative research.  
Broadly, thematic analysis acknowledges that, drawing from a number of different sources, 
similar answers or information may arise, which can be categorised into dominant themes. 
Using a thematic approach, one can draw key ideas from the minutiae of points which a series 
of in-depth interviews may develop. In doing so, answers suggested by one interview can be 
examined against other similar points from other interviews or sources. This allows for those 
points to be assessed for their relevancy and applicability. In short: it is a way of identifying, 
analysing and reporting salient patterns within data.  
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Part C: Results, Analysis, and Discussion: 
 
I spoke with 25 representatives from gentailers, consumer advocacy groups, politicians, 
regulators, and academics. I have also drawn on a large amount of analysis that has already 
been carried out – and reported in news media – about the sector, although I found little 
discourse analysis as such. What is clear from these primary and secondary sources is that there 
is diversity of opinion about what the electricity sector is currently doing, how it should be 
structured, and the goals for which the sector and government should be striving.   
Despite the diversity of opinion, these opinions can be categorised thematically in a way that 
clearly frames the debate on those particular issues. What I seek to do in this section is to look 
at those key categories and analyse the debate within. Specifically, I will address four aspects: 
1. The drivers behind change in the electricity sector that we have seen, before the 2014 
general election campaign;  
2. The stakeholders who have historically had influence in the development of policy, and 
the implications of that influence; 
3. The lessons we can take from the NZ Power proposal; and  
4. The future roads down which policy can be expected to go. 
 
Chapter 4: Drivers of Change 
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis described the changes to the electricity sector over the past 25 years. 
Three common themes of these changes align with the trilemma discussed in chapter 1.2, which 
those in the electricity sector describe as the accomplishments of the industry, and successive 
governments, in the 30-year period to 2014:    
1. Securing supply. Security of supply means that whenever a customer tries to turn their 
lights on, they turn on. In several different occasions in the past 20 years, New Zealand 
has not had guaranteed supply – either because of faults within the network, or more 
fundamentally, insufficient generation capacity (Interview with Hon/ David Caygill 
2014; Interview with Brian Fallow 2014). Regulators and the industry have worked 
through a variety of new regulations and business practices as described above to 
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attempt to remedy these problems (Interview with James Tipping 2014; Toby 
Stevenson 2014; Blackwell 2009);  
2. Achieving economic prices. As noted above, there is concern in New Zealand that 
customers – particularly residential customers – are paying too high a price for their 
electricity. Economic prices has been defined by many as ensuring that consumers pay 
“the real, long-run marginal cost price” for electricity, so as to maintain the incentives 
to invest, but also to ensure that consumers do not face prices above the long-run 
marginal cost of production (Interview with Ralph Matthes of MEUG 2014; Interview 
with Molly Melhuish 2014; Interview with Dominic Milicich 2014; Interview with 
Shane Dinnan 2014).  
3. Maintaining and advancing environmental concerns. For many, this is the primary 
concern for the modern electricity sector, with a particular concern about carbon 
dioxide emissions from generation (Interview with Gareth Hughes 2014). As interest 
over climate change accelerates, so too does the relevance of this concern.  
These categories have arisen as a consequence of four key drivers of policy change observed 
over the years of policy change. (Interview with Paul Baker 2014; Interview with Ross Parry 
2014). Specifically, there have been four key drivers behind the development of New Zealand’s 
electricity sector in the past 30 years. They are ideology, crisis, technology, and consumers 
(Interview with Gareth Wilson 2014; Interview with Electricity Authority 2014; Interview with 
Ralph Matthes of MEUG 2014). The interviews conducted for this thesis have confirmed the 
picture suggested by the literature. It is evident that an overriding ideological push towards 
market mechanisms for the wider economy has influenced the sector, but that was a necessary 
but not sufficient condition in itself to generate wholesale change. The changes to the sector 
came in response to a series of crises that saw blackouts across the country in the 1980s, or 
very high prices in the 2000s. The failures of the various ‘status quos’ facilitated the changes 
seen in the sector. The specifics of the changes were achievable thanks to the rise of new 
technologies at the time. Historically, the advent of real-time, high volume trading, and more 
recently the promise of distributed generation, reflect the role technology has and continues to 
play in the sector. Finally consumers have driven change through influencing government, or 
the industry itself.  
These drivers are ordered in a way that reflect their relative importance, in accordance with the 
relative emphasis placed on them by study respondents. A more detailed discussion of each 
follows. 
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4.1 Ideology 
  
Nobel Laureate Vernon Smith was involved with the development of the market for electricity 
in both Australia and New Zealand. When talking of the changes in the structure of the industry, 
and of changing mind-sets from pro-intervention to pro-market, the economist says that 
“people did not believe that you could have a market for electric power”. But after extensive 
modelling, and real-world application, he says “we won a series of battles; and the war” (Smith 
2014).  
These comments lend themselves to the arguments, made most often by the reform’s detractors, 
that the state of the sector as it is today comes from a drive to impose market concepts in a 
wide range of sectors of the New Zealand economy. This is certainly arguable for the first three 
tranches of policy change, which saw each time a growing role for the market in the sector 
(Table 2). 
Until the 1970s, New Zealand’s traditional economic partner was the United Kingdom – the 
latter’s economic wealth meant a high standard of living for New Zealand as the country’s 
export-led economy delivered considerable income to citizens and the government. This 
beneficial trade relationship New Zealand enjoyed with the United Kingdom came to an abrupt 
end with the latter’s entrance into the then European Economic Community in 1973 
(McKinnon 1997).  
The response to this significant shift in economic fortune, the Third National Government 
undertook a series of large-scale, centrally-led economic reforms called Think Big. These 
sought to increase the diversity of the New Zealand economy, and in doing so, safeguard future 
sources of revenue for citizens and the state. For a variety of factors, contemporary views of 
Think Big range from it being “unsuccessful” (Reserve Bank of New Zealand 2007) to a 
“disaster for New Zealand” (Easton 1989). 
By the mid-1980s, New Zealand was facing financial collapse. Part of the legacy of Muldoon 
was considerable fiscal overreach by the government, which severely constrained the 
government’s ability to generate sufficient revenue from state-owned investments (Schwartz 
1994). New Zealand had high levels of fiscal debt, combined with poor fiscal management 
which had created a structural deficit. Additionally, due to heavy regulation and an overvalued 
currency (which itself caused a currency crisis in 1984), the country was regarded by some as 
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the “Albania of the South” (Hazledine 1998). This was an acknowledgement that successive 
governments had generated obligations on the state which could not be fulfilled.  
The response to Thing Big, and broader Muldoonist policies, was the succeeding Fourth Labour 
Government (1984-1990), which enacted policies that reflected classic or neoliberal economic 
theory – meaning greater free markets, an independent and strong central bank, and broadly a 
smaller role for the state. Given the moniker Rogernomics (after the Finance Minister Sir Roger 
Douglas), the Government’s policies radically reversed the strategy and policies of the 1970s 
and early 1980s: 
“Between 1984 and 1993, New Zealand underwent radical economic reform, 
moving from what had probably been the most protected, regulated and state-
dominated system of any capitalist democracy to an extreme position at the open, 
competitive, free-market end of the spectrum” (Nagel 1998). 
A fundamental tenet of greater economic liberalism with regard to the role of government is 
that individual consumers and businesses are best placed to make investment and purchasing 
decisions for themselves and the country than the state is (Friedman and Friedman, Free to 
Choose 1980).  
This ideological shift occurred across the whole of the economy, with the electricity sector not 
exempt (Interview with Stephen Poletti 2015) as outlined in Chapter 1. Ensuring politically 
advantageous pricing to consumers was a central goal of the sector for a long period of time. 
The change in ideology meant that, rather than prices reflecting the whim of politicians, or the 
design of an official, prices had to reflect the economic realities of supply and demand 
(Interview with Business New Zealand 2014). This is consistent with the wider policy shift 
seen in New Zealand and throughout the developed world, where prices were to reflect a 
combination of the cost to produce, and consumers’ willingness to pay. This divergence in 
views highlights the ongoing dispute between those who believe that market principles will 
lead to the best outcome for consumers, and those who see the sector as providing an essential 
public service which necessitates government participation or at least firm regulation. 
Some in the sector5 felt that the reforms were a natural part of the broader change seen in New 
Zealand – and the sector would inevitably feel the effects of the predispositions of the Fourth 
                                               
5 Including Molly Melhuish (Interview with Molly Melhuish 2014), Dr. Geoff Bertram (Bertram, Restructuring 
the New Zealand Electricity Sector 1984-2005 2007), and Bryan Leyland (Interview with Bryan Leyland 2014). 
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Labour Government. Others6 believed that individuals like David Caygill, Max Bradford, and 
organisations like The Treasury had been consistently seeking to implement their version of a 
market for electricity, as their conception of electricity was that it was like any other 
commodity.  
To that suggestion, Caygill, Bradford, a Treasury official and others have responded by saying 
their key objective was to secure supply and price, and that the ideology behind the change was 
secondary: 
One asks the question: Why did country after country opt to introduce competitive 
electricity markets in the 1990s? An answer that starts with Margaret Thatcher or 
Ronald Reagan is in my view ultimately unconvincing, or at best partial.  Yes, 
countries learn from each other. And policy can be the subject of fashion as much 
as other areas of human endeavour.  But electricity has been around for a 
century.  Why didn't we run competitive markets to supply it decades 
ago?  Because we didn't know how to. (Interview with Hon David Caygill 2014). 
The concession in this statement by David Caygill, and from discussions with others involved 
in changing the sector, is that while ideology may not have been the key driver, it was for many 
an important aspect. Subsequent comments by Bradford corroborates this suggestion; he 
believes choice and competition will always give better outcomes than state intervention –the 
two options seen to be available to policy makers since 1984 (Bradford, Article for NZ Institute 
of Chartered Accountants 2013; Bradford, Power Play or Power Reforms? 1998; Interview 
with Max Bradford 2014; Bradford, The 1998/99 Electricity Reforms 2002; Bradford 2003;  
Roughnan 2002; Baldwin, Making sense of the mess 2003; Bradford, Electricity reform - facts 
and fiction 2011).  
Ideology as a driver can mean to some observers that individuals are zealots, passionately 
pursuing policies and objectives; with the implementation of those policies being seen – at least 
in part – as an end unto itself. The conception that politicians – particularly those of a neoliberal 
bent – care only about implementing their conception of the ideal policy cocktail is not 
uncommon. Sometimes this perception is legitimate. An article by former Finance Minister Sir 
Roger Douglas “The Politics of Successful Structural Reform” (Douglas 1989), which includes 
points such as “Speed is essential: it is impossible to go too fast”, spell out his conception of 
                                               
6 Including Consumer Magazine (Interview with Jessica Wilson and Susan Guthrie 2014), and Gareth Hughes 
(Interview with Gareth Hughes 2014) 
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the political advantages to implementing a set of policies by pushing for them as soon as “a 
window of opportunity opens”. This at least gives rise to a perception that the motivation is 
ideological, rather than based on a more balanced analysis. 
Douglas’s comments, of course, do not limit themselves to market or neoliberal ideas, but there 
is a notable perception that those pushing for neoliberal policies are ideological in their views; 
whereas others pushing for more leftish policies are seen as being less ideological. The fact 
that, really, any political position or idea is an ideology seems to be lost on many. 
The unique aspect of the beginning of the neoliberalisation of New Zealand’s electricity sector 
is that it was implemented by a Labour government. The ideology of that party – and 
particularly of people like Caygill and Douglas – was not Thatcher or Reagan-esque, where the 
intention was to overhaul those nations’ societies to fit a Chicago-school style economy. 
Rather, it was in their view rooted deeply in the Labour party’s principles (Douglas, 
Completing the Circle 1996). To illustrate the differences in ideology: while Reagan destroyed 
the power of the Air Traffic Controllers Union, and Thatcher the miners’ union, the Lange 
Government made no such destructive moves of a similar ilk, despite using similar policy tools 
to those two leaders. Indeed, Geoff Bertram describes the sector as not being neoliberal, but 
rather “pragmatic, but brutally pro-business” (Bertram, Interview with Geoff Bertram 2015). 
This undermines any simple concept of ideologically driven policy. When the policies are more 
associated with left-wing goals (for instance, equity), but the actual policies are more associated 
with right-wing principles (for instance, markets), what, then can the ideology of the people 
and policies be described as? It is not sufficient for people to describe politicians as “really just 
wanting to push a neoliberal agenda” (Interview with Jessica Wilson and Susan Guthrie 2014; 
Interview with Gareth Hughes 2014) to fully articulate the ideology of those responsible for 
the development of the sector. A more nuanced appreciated of policy makers’ goals and 
approaches is needed. 
In this instance, Caygill, Douglas, Bradford and others have all stated publicly that their 
intention was to protect consumers. The policy tools that had been used in the past – that is, 
state interventionism – had in their eyes failed to bring about good outcomes for consumers, as 
it was, for example, associated with poor investment performance in generation Thus, a new 
policy mix was required. The global and domestic tool de rigueur was markets. Simply 
adopting the widely used tools of competition and applying them to this sector does not, in this 
analysis, suggest an overwhelming drive based purely on ideological commitments to markets.  
63 
 
As to the question in Chapter 1, of whether the prices that existed before the electricity reforms 
were the appropriate prices for the resource, the ideological shift in mainstream discourse has 
provided an answer. Namely, the prices before the shift were seen as illegitimate, and the 
mechanisms used to generate those prices, too, were illegitimate. The appropriate prices for 
electricity were seen as those which are set by a confluence of supply and demand side utility 
maximisation – or the market.  
The fourth tranche of policy change saw a reversal of sorts to the trend of policy change seen 
to that point. A moderate Labour Government was in power in the 1999-2008 period, seeking 
to achieve a “Third Way” of politics, and implementing more traditional Labour party 
principles within the new neoliberal framework7. The policy intentions behind this tranche 
were to empower consumers so to ensure lower prices for them, while at the same time 
protecting supply, and making a nod to environmental goals such as increasing the penetration 
of renewables and increasing energy efficiency. Specifically, the Electricity Commission was 
established with the intention of providing greater regulatory oversight of the sector, and a 
firmer hand was placed on the sector as a whole. Additionally, measures to improve 
competition in the sector – including the aforementioned VAS – and the 2006 Ministerial 
Electricity Market Review’s endorsement of the market pushed for better outcomes for 
consumers. Notably, the abolition of the reserve energy scheme marked a departure of the 
government from providing dry-year energy reserves. 
The notable thing to draw from this is that the changes during this period were not a substantive 
change to the market structure that existed before it, but rather a limited adjustment of the 
institutions already established. The Fourth Tranche of change showed that the market 
approach to the sector had become the acceptable approach to managing supply, price, and 
environmental concerns. The “neoliberal paradigm” described in Chapter 2 had become 
entrenched within the sector, and those outside the sector viewed that paradigm favourably. 
David Parker, a notable opponent of the market as it stands (and an architect of NZ Power), 
was minister at the time of the 2006 Review. Despite his personal opposition to the fundamental 
premise of the structure, the policy consequence of his actions was to actually increase reliance 
on market concepts such as competition.  
Governmentality and policy incrementalism suggest reasons for this. Policy change can only 
happen within a window that is acceptable to the electorate. That window is one that, in a New 
                                               
7 (P. J. Hayes 2012; Porter and Craig 2004; Nolan 2010). 
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Zealand policy environment in the 2000s, had a clear orientation towards neoliberalism. Years 
of successive messaging from policy makers and advocates had (and arguably still have) made 
neoliberal concepts palatable to the electorate. Tranche three (1996-2001) happened in the 
1990s after six years of the Fourth Labour Government and its Rogernomics policies, and 
during nine years of the Fourth National Government whose economic policies – caricatured 
today by Ruth Richardson’s Mother of All Budgets – resembled a harder version of the 
preceding policy set. The Labour Government under Helen Clark came immediately after that 
shifted paradigm, and was unable to easily alter or reverse it.  
In addition to fifteen years of messaging to the effect that neoliberal concepts were the best 
framework to provide good outcomes for consumers, those years had also changed the way in 
which issues in the sector were considered. Framing of issues is important as it decides the 
conditions that are considered important, and those that are not. The framing of the electricity 
sector had put security of supply and price as being the first metrics upon which the success of 
the sector could be assessed. Considering that frame, it was comparatively easier to argue for 
markets, as under government management, there had been several supply concerns. 
Additionally, as shown in graphs 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, prices had remained lower and more stable 
under the market system up until 2001, with a rapid rise until the more recent changes in 2009. 
With that frame, and with those outcomes, it is clear why the changes that were possible were 
not what David Parker wanted, but rather continued to refine the institutions that existed. 
The final set of change from 2008 to the present saw a development of the sector along 
established market lines, catalysed by the 2009 Ministerial Review on the sector. As discussed, 
these changes saw an enhancement of market tools which is consistent with the neoliberal 
paradigm that existed. The explicit purpose of the Electricity Authority, established from this 
review, is to promise efficiency and competition within the sector. The other tools – especially 
through empowering the market operators to offer new products like electricity derivatives, 
furthers the notion of market ideology permeating the sector.  
Moving forward to the NZ Power proposal, the Green Party attempted to argue the merits of 
NZ Power within this neoliberal framing, suggesting that the proposal could “break the power 
of the established gentailers” to “create electricity market competition” (Green Party Press 
Release 2013). That arguments were made on the ground of market principles, rather than 
attempting to shift the discourse, speaks to the point that the orthodoxy of neoliberalism is 
firmly established; but moreover, policy makers, in attempting to craft new policy, had to use 
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the established expectations of neoliberalism to attempt to effect change – a key point of 
governmentality.  
Ideology influenced the development of the electricity sector in the same way it influenced the 
transformation of New Zealand’s economy as a whole. It created a paradigm that made market 
tools more acceptable and policy makers took their lead from that (Rudman 2013). More 
recently, that shift in ideology meant that even a more left-leaning Labour Government 15 
years after 1984 was not able to shift the policy frame back to a more interventionist approach. 
Indeed, the policy choices made by politicians over that period enhanced and refined the market 
structure that existed.  
 
4.2 Crisis 
  
 Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, 
the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. (Friedman, 
Capitalism and Freedom 1982).  
Building on the literature from policy incrementalism and the Overton Window, there are 
grounds for believing that radical policy shifts by government are usually either very difficult 
to enact, or if enacted, do not stay in place due to backlash from the electorate. The exceptions 
to this, writers such as Naomi Klein, in The Shock Doctrine, and others suggest, are instances 
where the status quo has been sufficiently disrupted. Previously radical or unpopular policies 
are said to become more palatable to the electorate, as they are seen as a necessary response to 
catastrophe or crisis.  
Many commentators have applied this premise to the action taken by government to effect 
policy change in the New Zealand electricity sector. A series of crises of supply, price, or 
sustainability preceded many of the policy changes seen in the sector, and some believe these 
changes could have only happened because of these extreme events. The idea that crisis was 
the driving force behind development of policy in the sector can be considered both within the 
context of a wider ideological push within the sector, or seen as independent of  any particular 
political bent – with policy makers simply struggling pragmatically to fix the problems arising. 
This section argues that there is at least a loose correlation between observed crises, and 
significant shifts in policy. It will also show that at times these crises are likely to have provided 
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the necessary exogenous push to advance political goals, but that this is not necessarily the 
case. An examination of the discourse used at times of previous crisis does, however, suggest 
that pre-existing ideological dispositions and frameworks supply ammunition and agendas that 
are used at times of crisis (Blackwell 2009). 
As summarised in Chapter 1, there were five key tranches of reforms:  
1. From 1984 to 1986, a greater presence of market forces to exert influence on the 
government as a result of the McLachlan report to Treasury (Interview with Business 
New Zealand 2014),  
2. Over 1987-1995, the establishment of ECNZ, of Transpower, and the broader 
corporatisation of the sector.  
3. From 1996-2001, a very light-handed government approach to regulation in the sector. 
Wholesale market for electricity established. 
4. From 2002-2008, a scaling back of the light-handed government approach to regulation 
in the market. Establishment of the Electricity Commission 
5. From 2008-present, development of new market tools, the Electricity Authority, and 
the Electricity Industry Participation Code.  
Consider the context before these changes.  
There were two crises that facilitated tranche one of changes. First, the economy was in a broad 
state of stasis, which itself allowed for a change in the ideological drivers for the wider 
economy. This has been discussed above at 4.1(a). The notable failure of the established 
doctrine of governance facilitated the shift in approach to free market concepts.  
Second, there were supply challenges which faced the electricity sector, for which established 
practices to resolve were either insufficient, or lacked credibility within the new ideological 
narratives. For decades, government decided in investment in generation capacity, but also 
encouraged demand, and made negligible provision for dry hydro years. This led to several 
instances where supply was insufficient to meet demand. In the 1970s, there were four different 
instances of the government requesting “voluntary” savings, which constituted limitations on 
the use of electricity for, amongst other things, heating water for domestic use (New Zealand 
Electricity Shortage Review Committee 1992; Baldwin, History of electricity security in New 
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Zealand 2005). These restrictions came on the back of several decades of rolling blackouts, 
and stringent controls on usage.  
These instances of a lack of resilience of the nation’s infrastructure were problematic for 
proponents of the status quo. Combine this with the broader change in support for 
interventionist government meant that other structures for the sector became more palatable 
(Interview with Jessica Wilson and Susan Guthrie 2014). The literature of policy 
incrementalism suggests that policy change will only happen to the extent the electorate will 
allow it. When people flick the switch in their kitchens and the lights do not turn on, there will 
be a quick and intense response from those affected to those in change. The 29 October 2014 
central Auckland power cut supports that view: a fire at a substation caused an outage for 
thousands of people for three days. Several articles8 were written about this episode, all 
carrying a sentiment for “something to be done” to fix the problem. Rotherham’s article in the 
NBR illustrates this most clearly, with the Prime Minister John Key explicitly stating that some 
new process would be put in place to avoid this occurring again. 
What is important to note is that this outage did not arise as a result of inadequate supply; rather 
a rare and unexpected fire. Put another way: the blackout was not a consequence of structural 
failure; rather it was a black-swan event. 
For policy development, a recognition that the underlying structure is flawed facilitates an even 
greater policy change. This is because if the electorate believes that simply tinkering on existing 
policy (by, say, installing a fire retardant system at the substation) is insufficient to resolve the 
problem, policy makers are empowered to act in a more sweeping manner. If the literature 
supporting the Overton Window and policy incrementalism is correct, it explains how the 
government was able to reverse decades of established policy for the sector for a model that 
was new both domestically, and on an international scale. 
Understanding the implications of governmentality show why it is that a market was the 
solution chosen. It was consistent with the wider changes that were occurring. But more 
importantly, it would mean that the government of the day would be less responsible for the 
running of the system. Thus, if anything were to go wrong, they would bear less of the cost of 
that failure. This was agreeable even to politicians not disposed to the market.  
                                               
8 (Stuff.co.nz 2014; Manning 2014; Field and Walters 2014; Manning b 2014; APNZ Staff 2014; Rotherham 
2014). 
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The pattern that began with Tranche One was developed further before the second Tranche of 
change. The developing institutions that appeared after 1984 were apportioned considerable 
power over the sector. Transpower, a new SOE, was empowered as the market operator. 
Transpower as an institution was undeveloped, which became problematic over this time as the 
country was seeing uncommonly variable hydroelectric levels, adding to the complexity of 
managing supply of electricity (The Electricity Commission 2008). In 1992, a drought caused 
inflow levels into hydro lakes to be in the lowest quartile of historic data (Morrison & Co. 
2003). In order to “keep the lights on”, water heating was generally cut for two thirds of the 
day, and Comalco – an aluminium smelter now owned by Rio Tinto, and big power user – 
closed one of its three production lines.  
At this time, there were price caps of 15c/kWh imposed on retail residential electricity. This 
restricted investment in new generation capacity (for the reasons discussed in 1.3(b)). Spot 
prices on electricity were decided a week in advance, and the process to determine those prices 
was confidential. The 1992 Electricity Shortage Review Committee Report recommended 
several changes to the established institutions and practices. Notably, it was recommended that 
the 15c/kWh price ceiling be removed; longer, and more flexible contracts should be facilitated 
by ECNZ (itself an early version of the hedge market); and there should be greater 
communication of ECNZ’s activities to the public. Again, however, for many9 these changes 
were seen as merely tinkering with a still-flawed system. The changes that eventuated, as 
documented in Chapter 1, show the extent to which the Overton Window was opened in 
response to the large challenges the electorate saw within the sector. 
The mid-1990s period before the third Tranche of reforms was the first regulatory framework 
that resembled the structure of the market seen today in New Zealand. In the prelude to the 
changes, there were a number of issues that facilitated additional policy change within the 
sector – and of note was one of the first instances of environmental issues having an impact. 
First, there were the seemingly perennial issues of security of supply. In 2001, there was a 
drought worse than any in the preceding 71 years, with a winter that was very cold (Infratil NZ 
Limited 2001). These conditions combined to put considerable constraints on electricity 
supply. There was, however, no need for compulsory usage restrictions (Evans and Meade 
2005, 173). With a now uncapped price for electricity, the spot price for electricity was high 
(Evans and Meade 2005, 75). In addition to this market force, government instituted a voluntary 
                                               
9 And importantly: for Mark Bradford 
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“10% reduction for 10 weeks” campaign. The combination of market and government signals 
saw a reduction in prices, and supported the view that the established system works (Mandow 
2003). In 2003, there was another shortage, with similar prices increase (Morrison & Co. 2003). 
Despite the market signalling the constraints of a dry season, and prices functioning in the 
appropriate manner, there was a building perception that there were still some flaws within the 
established model. 
In addition to problems with hydroelectricity capacity in New Zealand, there was an emerging 
risk with thermal plants as well. By 2002, natural gas supplies in the Maui gas field were 
determined to be considerably less than was previously forecast. Prior to 2002, prices for 
natural gas were held low due to a long-term contract negotiated and enforced by the 
government. In response to the realisation of significantly lower supply, this ceiling on price 
was removed, and the price for natural gas climbed inexorably. In 2002, the price in 2009 
dollars for a GJ of natural gas was $4, and by the end of the year it was $5. The real value of 
gas had doubled in value by 2009 (Stanford and Alfred 2011). A considerably proportion of 
New Zealand’s peaker capacity was provided by natural gas (Bertram 2007). This contributed 
to concerns over price in New Zealand. 
Finally, the High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) connection that allows for electricity 
generated in the South Island to be transmitted to the North Island failed in 2004. Again, the 
market functioned by increasing prices in the North Island due to constrained supply – from 
$50/MWh to $810/MWh at one point; and as high as $1,083/MWh (Evans and Meade 2005). 
The culmination of these crises was a sense that reform was needed. However, with a National 
government in place, the solution chosen was a policy cocktail that aimed to improve market 
functioning, particularly with the VAS deal implemented in 2006. In addition to supply and 
price concerns, environmental concerns also had an impact. The crisis that is climate change 
was gaining greater mainstream acceptance, along with the political capital generated to do 
something to resolve it. An Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) developed in the mid-2000s and 
enacted by the Labour Government in 2008 was designed to include electricity generation – 
increasing the cost of thermal plants. Additionally, a moratorium on new thermal generation 
was implemented.  
That the ETS was pared back in 2009 and 2012, following the change of government, and the 
moratorium repealed outright, speaks to the legitimacy aspect of the Overton window. The 
moratorium represented a considerable shift from the permissive status quo in terms of 
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allowable generation sources. That it was so promptly repealed speaks to the central premise 
of the need for incremental change, in line with the ideological tide. The ETS as it was first 
proposed also represented something that was rather too significant a shift for the electorate – 
but that changes, to make it considerably milder, were passed by the succeeding government 
speaks to the need, again, for incremental change to ensure policies stick.  
Crises have occurred through the history of the sector since the 1980s start of the reforms. They 
have necessitated a response from government to refine and fix the causes of the crises. The 
responses that did come from successive governments existed within the paradigms that had 
previously been established. Put another way – policy makers had only a limited set of tools in 
the policy toolbox from which they could select responses. No more clearly was this seen than 
in the Fifth Labour Government’s response to supply and price crises in the early 2000s; where 
despite being a centre-left government, the policies enacted enhanced the nature of the market 
in New Zealand. What this shows is that ideology, informed by governmentality, is limited by 
the possibilities of policy incrementalism. Crises empower governments to take action, but 
those actions are necessarily limited.  
4.3 Technology 
 
As with all markets, the rise of different technologies has facilitated a number of different 
opportunities for disruptive innovation within the electricity sector. There are two key 
examples of the role technology has played in altering the electricity sector. In the 1990s, the 
rise of computers facilitated the introduction of high-frequency trading on the spot market that 
is still functionally in use today. More recently, the rise of distributed generation has the 
potential for disrupting the market again. This section will look at the role technology has in 
driving policy change within the sector. 
 
In the electricity system, there is a unique need for the supply of electricity to at all times be in 
exact balance with the amount demanded. If this balance is not met, the electrical frequency 
will either rise or fall in response to that mismatch. The consequence of any imbalance is, in 
very short order, a collapse of the infrastructure – leading to blackouts and damage to power 
plants. The practical consequence of this is a need for either a very controlled demand side, or 
a very responsive supply side. Controlling demand can be easy, through the establishment of 
quotas for consumption. This has meant that electricity systems world-wide were originally 
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run as monopolies - typically, but not invariably state-owned.  But even where they were not 
state-owned, they were monopolies (Interview with Hon/ David Caygill 2014). 
 
Having a responsive supply-side requires the ability to signal clearly and quickly to producers 
to ramp up or down their production. This is heavily dependent upon high-speed computing 
power to both understand both sides of the supply/demand equation. By the early 1990s, 
computers became sufficiently cheap and ubiquitous that they were being employed in number 
of previously-unused capacities. In short: it allowed for competition between generators - 
essentially competing for the right to supply - in real time. This was not something unique to 
New Zealand: electricity wholesale markets sprang up around the world; in Norway in the 
United Kingdom, and at a regional level in the US. 
 
Starting in 1996, New Zealand saw a similar roll-out of a real-time wholesale market for 
electricity. Different wholesalers were able to now – in real-time – able to compete for the 
provision of electricity to what was a government monopsony. 
 
The natural progression was from competition among generators to the possibility of 
competition at the retail level. According to David Caygill: 
 
“There has never been an inherent reason why different entities didn't retail 
electricity, but if it couldn't be purchased for other than a single price then there 
wasn't much point to retail competition…. Why didn't we run competitive markets 
to supply it decades ago?  Because we didn't know how to - until computers 
became fast enough and cheap enough to run the algorithms needed for real time 
auctions.  That happened in the 1990s.” (Interview with Hon/ David Caygill 2014) 
  
Few other commentators have spoken to the role which technology played in the development 
of the sector, yet it makes intuitive sense. Ideological bents or crises have generated change in 
the sector, but as with any set of ideas, they have to be applied in the real world.  
  
The possibility of wholesale and retail competition was facilitated by structural change; and 
this was change seen not only in New Zealand, but across the world, as the splitting of 
electricity systems into component parts occurred. The precise details of the market systems 
and structures have varied from country to country, reflecting different circumstances and 
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policy choices.  But the underlying principle of technology facilitating this change cannot be 
ignored, and the broad similarities are more significant than the precise differences. It is clear 
that the process of reform was driven at least in part by the technical possibility of competition, 
rather than pure ideology.   
 
“Put another way, if we had been able to deliver electricity competitively 
all along, we would have – just as other goods and services are delivered 
almost universally via markets of producers, distributors, and consumers” 
(Interview with Hon/ David Caygill 2014).  
 
 
This view neglects, of course, that many more complex or heterogeneous goods or services, 
such as aspects of health care, are more difficult to deliver competitively, which is why they 
are either delivered by the government or are heavily regulated.  
 
The contemporary technology that has the potential to disrupt the established electricity sector 
is distributed generation (Bertram, Interview with Geoff Bertram 2015). Facilitated by 
developments in Smart Meters (Interview with Stephen Poletti 2015), distributed generation 
involves consumers developing their own generation capacity – typically through the 
installation of solar PV panels on their property. It is viewed by some as the future of not only 
renewable electricity, but efficient and effective electricity management more generally (B. V. 
Mathiesen 2011). In Germany alone, renewable electricity accounts at times for over 50% of 
that nation’s generation capacity, where in 2000 the proportion was only 6.3% (Economist 
2013). 
 
When distributed generation is implemented correctly, it allows for consumers of electricity to 
produce some or all of their electricity needs at a particular time, or even produce surplus 
electricity to their needs, and so become micro-generators for the grid as a whole. This threatens 
established electricity providers as it increases competition and complexity on the supply side, 
but also has the potential to upset the demand side of the market.  
 
New Zealand’s investment into distributed generation, both politically and economically, is 
considerably behind that of many other developed nations. This is largely due to an absence of 
73 
 
subsidies and legislation to incentivise investment into distributed generation that are present 
in many other nations (EECA 2013).  
 
These subsidies and regulatory frameworks can be best categorised as feed-in tariffs, net 
metering, net billing, and regular investment subsidies. Different levels of government – 
central, state, and local – have across the world provided for various combinations of these 
incentives to distributed generation, with varying degrees of uptake. There is limited drive for 
the development of this technology from politicians, and even less from the industry itself; 
indeed, there is sometimes resistance. However, some consumers are pushing for greater 
uptake. There are considerable barriers to uptake – including cost and a lack of awareness of 
the technology (East Harbour Management Services 2006) – but the environment created by 
retailers and government in which distributed generation exists has not lowered those barriers.  
 
 Grid-connected system 
2kWp 
Off-grid system capable of 
generating 
between 5-7kWh/day 
PV modules (2kW) $8,000 - $16,000 $8,000 - $16,000 
Inverter/charger $2,500 - $5,500 $3,000 - $8,000 
Framing $1,000 - $2,000 $1,000 - $2,000 
Batteries Not required $6,500 - $14,000 
Diesel generator Not required $3,000 - $11,000 
Balance of system +-$1,000 +-$4000 
Installation $1,000 - $2,000 $3,000 - $6,000 
TOTAL $13,500 - $26,500 $28,500 - $61,000 
$ per Wp installed (incl. GST) $7 - $13 $14 - $30 
  
 
 
 
The above table illustrates the financial barrier to distributed generation’s uptake on the most 
common form of distributed generation – a solar photovoltaic system. There are presently no 
official subsidy schemes for distributed generation; however there has been a trial programme 
in 2008/2009 that sought to “kick start” distributed generation in New Zealand (EECA 2013). 
This was largely unsuccessful. EECA’s attitude to distributed generation could be described as 
Table 4: Indicative costs of setting up a PV-based system (EECA 2010).
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at best ambivalent and at worst negative (Boyles 2013).  A clear indication of EECA’s support 
of distributed generation is that the most recent information on the cost of establishing 
distribution generation at a property is a half-decade old. In that time, cost are now nearly $1/w 
in Australia (APVI 2014). 
In contrast to New Zealand’s lack of government support, there is some support, even if 
sporadic, in Australian states10.  The wider uptake of distributed generation shows that even 
small support for Distributed Generation by government can reduce the barriers to uptake of 
distributed generation (Edis 2014).   
EECA states that the growth of distributed generation is desirable, in order to increase the levels 
of renewable energy in New Zealand. If this is indeed the case (considering the revealed stance 
of EECA this is disputable), it would make EECA’s position consistent with international 
literature and government policy. But it would then require a shift in the current position by 
New Zealand’s government. National and Act party spokespeople have both commented that 
distributed generation is something that is desirable, but their ambivalence is suggested by the 
lack of a concrete plan to promote the use of this technology (Bridges, Speech to NZ Energy 
Conference 2014 2014). The Labour Party, too, gives at-best luke-warm support for 
government subsidies for the technology, saying it should be at the “forefront” of their energy 
policy, but again offer no substantive proposals in this regard (NZ Labour Party 2014). When 
asked of his party’s position on distributed generation, Gareth Hughes, the Green Party’s 
spokesperson on energy, said there was “no official party policy” on the role of distributed 
generation (Interview with Gareth Hughes 2014). This is surprising from a party with a strong 
environmental focus.  
In addition to sclerotic support by government is a broad status quo bias that infects both the 
electricity industry, and regular consumers.  As stated above, the electricity industry is opposed 
to distributed generation as it has the potential to negatively impact revenue for the companies, 
and so they act to ensure the status quo. This is done subtly, for example by having no mention 
of distributed generation on the energy retailers’ websites. A search on Contact Energy, 
Genesis Energy, Mercury Energy, Trustpower, and Meridian Energy websites for “distributed 
generation” reveals sparse results.11 Making it relatively more difficult for a residential 
                                               
10 It should be noted that there is growing opposition within the Australian public to distributed generation, owing 
to hidden costs (Taylor 2014). 
11 Search done on the first of the months of September, October, November and December 2014, and January 
2015 for “distributed generation”. Contact Energy offers no results. Genesis Energy has one result, which is a 
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consumer to learn more about distributed generation, and to see how it could work for them, 
means that distributed generation becomes less accessible for the marginal consumer. Active 
discussions as part of this thesis with gentailers suggests that access to net metering is low.  
Technology has played an historic role in facilitating the change to the sector over the past 25 
years. The question for the industry and for policy makers in the near future will be the extent 
to which technology changes will be able to take hold in the sector again. Distributed generation 
together with a smarter grid is the most widely available technology on offer at the moment, 
and as such, offers the prospect of disruption to the status quo, but also environmental benefits 
and, for some households, a welcome prospect of energy independence and greater price 
security. Considering the want for government action here, and the (understandable) 
unwillingness of the established gentailers to lead the charge on this issue, this, as with many 
changes seen, will come down to consumer preferences. The next section will discuss the role 
of consumers in facilitating this, and other changes, in the sector.   
 
4.4 Consumers  
 
Consumers have been, and are able to influence the actions and development of the New 
Zealand electricity sector in two key ways. First, consumers are in large part also the voting 
public, and their political wants translate into change for the sector. Second, consumers through 
their revealed preferences shape the sector through changing the behavior of sellers.  
4.1(d) i: Consumers as voters:  
The political influence of consumers can be divided into two distinct periods – before the 
market, and after it. Before the market, as noted, prices were set by state fiat. Those consumers 
who wielded the most political power were able to use that power to get better prices for 
themselves than would be the case under a market system. We know this is true, because of the 
relative price changes to industrial, commercial, and residential consumers since deregulation. 
                                               
link to a page outlining the fees for services from Genesis. Two lines correspond to DG. Meridian Energy has a 
number of results for DG – many of which link to reports produced by Meridian. There is one page available to 
show how customers can take up solar panels (https://www.meridianenergy.co.nz/your-home/generating-solar-
energy/). Mercury Energy does not even have a search function. Its list of FAQs does not yield any information 
on DG. Mighty River Power yields no results.  
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The point is that residential consumers can vote, and it behooved the state to make prices 
artificially lower (Interview with Graeme Everett 2014).  
Since the market, the ability for consumers who vote to wield that power in a way to cap prices 
has been removed. This has had the implication of changing the way consumers influence the 
political landscape, and widening the range of views that get heard in the political arena – 
specifically by increasing the voice of commercial and industrial concerns (Easton, Electric 
Retoric: Sneering Instead of Thinking 1999). This thesis has already discussed the implications 
for resident consumers on this change. This sub-section will discuss how this has impacted the 
commercial and industrial views. 
2012 Republican Presidential Nominee Mitt Romney may have thought that “corporations are 
people”, but the Electoral Act 1993 disagrees. So when voting becomes a less important metric 
of influence over government policy, those with less of a vote can gain a comparatively greater 
influence. In the electricity, this is seen through corporations flexing their proverbial muscle to 
get particular concessions from the government. Most recently, the Rio Tinto Tiwai smelting 
plant gained a 30 million dollar subsidy from the government (Santhebennur 2013). This was 
in part to secure jobs in the region that is dependent on the plant for its economy. But there is 
also suggestion that the subsidy was implemented to protect the value of the electricity sector, 
particular in the lead up to the partial asset sale (Oram 2013). The subsidy was seen by Finance 
Minister Bill English as a "one off incentive payment to help secure agreement on the revised 
contract because of the importance of the smelter to the stability of the New Zealand electricity 
market" (Fairfax Media 2013). 
Tiwai smelter is New Zealand’s largest single consumer of electricity, and the closure of the 
plant would have cut approximately 15% of New Zealand’s total demand (Bennett 2007). This 
would have hurt the value of all electricity companies as the freed capacity would have resulted 
in reduced prices; but particularly Meridian Energy who was the sole provider of electricity to 
the plant. 
This example helps to illustrate the wider point that, while individual prices cannot be set 
through lobbying of government, sufficient political weight can be leveraged to gain economic 
advantage.  
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4.1(d) i: Consumers as actors in a market:  
Since the breakup of the sector into competing gentailers and smaller, more niche retailer 
companies, consumers have been given more choice over their electricity supplier. As covered, 
many consumers are exercising that choice, with approximately 1.8% of ICPs changing 
retailers in December of 2014; and a total of 19.09% changing in all of 2014. This trend is 
increasing over time (Figure 10).  
With consumers able to exercise their preference for alternative service, price, or feature, it 
places pressure on retailers to also provide services, prices, or features to customers to maintain 
and grow their market share. This competition – even if only at the margins – pushes down 
prices, and encourages retailers to offer innovative products. 
Two recent examples of genuinely innovative retailers are Powershop and Flick. As noted in 
Chapter 1, retailers typically offer (particularly to smaller customers) “fixed price, variable 
quantity” hedge-type contracts, whereby consumers can generally consume as much electricity 
as they want, for a fixed priced. Powershop and Flick offer different products Powershop offer 
customers the ability to buy parcels of electricity at prices that vary across the course of the 
year. Consumers are able to play the market, and attempt to pre-purchase electricity at one 
price, and use it at a later time where the electricity would otherwise be more expensive. Flick 
allows small consumers direct access to the spot market. This allows consumers to change their 
behavior, and use more energy-intensive appliances at times where electricity is cheaper. 
Figure 10: Proportion of customers, as measured by ICPs, 
changing electricity retailer every year (EA 2014). 
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Typically the spot price at non-peak times is lower than the typical hedge price offered by other 
retailers. In becoming more aware of the cost of consumption at different times, customers can 
save money. 
In addition to the market creating new ways to selling electricity to consumers, it is also 
facilitating a (slow) uptake of new technology. As discussed above, distributed generation and 
its associated technology offers consumers an ability to reduce their dependency on established 
– or even new – retailers.  
A central question is whether electricity retailers are price setters, or price takers. These terms 
can be used to describe the relative market power of a company. Price setting companies have 
an ability to force customers to accept a given price, because of the outstanding nature of their 
commodities, or lack of alternatives (Khemani and Shapiro 1993) (a typical example is Apple 
iPhones, which are largely immune to broader supply and demand pressures in the wider 
smartphone market). Price taking companies can only expect to receive the market price for 
their good, owing to the fungible nature of their commodity (Khemani and Shapiro 1993) (a 
typical example is wheat, where there is very little ability to differentiate goods, and there is 
considerable international competition for the good). Having a market of price setting 
companies typically describes a failed market (Salop 1979). 
In the time of ECNZ, and arguably for a considerable proportion of the recent history of the 
electricity sector, retailers – and particularly the gentailers – were likely price setters (Bradford 
2004). The limited competition, the considerably barriers to entry for competitors, and the 
general confused state of the market limited the ability for customers (particularly residential 
customers) to exercise market power.  
This is shifting.  
The rise of new retailing companies offering new and innovative products to customers – 
significantly reducing their costs – is breaking the power of the five gentailers, and making 
them more susceptible to competition (P. Smellie 2009). The rise of new technology – some of 
which (like the internet) facilitates the new retailers; some of which (like distributed 
generation) decreases the dependency on established retailers – is changing retailers from 
setters to takers. This is a sign of a healthy (or at least: less sick) market. The rise of consumer 
choice will lead to better outcomes for consumers; and indeed already is.  
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Chapter 5: People with influence  
  
For a sector with a history of decades of change, and with a far reaching scope that affects all 
New Zealanders, it could be difficult to pin down an answer to the question “Who has, and has 
had, material influence in the development of policy in the electricity sector?”. 
However, conjecture in response to this question has been diverse. “Roger Douglas”, “David 
Caygill”, “Max Bradford”, “Carl Hansen”, and “David Parker” are names that are commonly 
stated when the question is asked. Respondents from across industry, academia, the media, and 
politics point to these individuals and a few other organisations when attempting to pinpoint 
exactly who has had influence in the development of the sector, and at what time. This section 
examines who is perceived to have had influence in the sector since the beginning of the 1980s 
reform, looking specifically at government (both politicians and government bodies), the 
media, and industry. The role of consumers has already been discussed, but as noted, their role 
in influencing the sector is shifting and developing. 
5.1 Government 
 
This thesis has described the ways in which government and its agencies have had influence in 
the development of the electricity sector. Specifically, government has influenced and 
developed the framing in which policy is made, and against which new proposals are assessed. 
As discussed, the role that government plays in a day to day sense has reduced, but the influence 
at a higher policy most certainly has not. What has not been discussed as deeply is the role 
government agencies play in the sector, specifically that of the Electricity Authority. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the Authority enforces the Electricity Industry Participation Code, 
and acts as an independent entity overseeing conduct within the market. Ostensibly 
independent, the Authority was established to enhance competition, reliability, and efficiency 
(Electricity Authority n.d.). Sometimes, the independent status of the Authority, and its mission 
to support market structures, have led to some internal conflict. In a context where a market 
structure is accepted by most in the sector as the correct framework, it is easy for the Authority 
to maintain both. In a situation where a stakeholder seeks to challenge that market premise, the 
authority has a decision of whether independence or its other missions are more important. 
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NZ Power was a challenge to the neoliberal paradigm which in itself led to accusations that the 
Authority’s independence was illusory: it had a vested interest. More specifically, NZ Power 
was a direct challenge to the existence of the Authority – in that NZ Power would subsume and 
replace the Authority (New Zealand Labour Party 2013). Labour and the Greens explicitly 
stated that the Authority had failed in controlling “the unjustifiable rise in electricity prices” 
(Green Party 2013). In response to this, the Authority went on the offensive against NZ Power. 
A report released in January of 2014 explaining how electricity price changes were below the 
changes in the cost of production, sought to challenge the premise of NZ Power (Electricity 
Authority 2014), and spread those arguments within the media12. Additionally, between the 
release of NZ Power, and the election, the Authority challenged assertions of Greens, Labour, 
and their associates: “Conclusions based on inadequate research are not a basis for sound 
economic policy”, said Dr Brent Layton, then head of the Authority. Proposals like NZ Power 
were “found wanting in terms of what would be of long term benefit to consumers” (Business 
Desk 2013).  
At that point the Authority not only offered analysis consistent with its purview, but actively 
sought to undermine a disruptive policy proposal, it brought into question its independence. 
Considering the stature of the Authority within the sector, and wider perceptions of it, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the position of, and arguments made by, the Authority carry 
considerable weight.  
 
5.2 The Media  
 
Most people do not get their information on policy through reading press releases posted to the 
Beehive website, or through attending public events hosted by politicians (American Press 
Institute 2014); rather, they receive information as presented in the news and social media. 
What this means is the way in which the news and arguments are presented in those media is 
often more important than the original intent or arguments set forth by policy makers.  
The media, then, has a central role in the construction and facilitation of the debate on policy 
proposals. Hostile media makes it more difficult for those to whom they are hostile to get 
positive coverage – or indeed coverage at all. Incompetent or disinterested media makes for a 
                                               
12 An example of which includes: (BusinessDesk 2014),  
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debate that is shallow, and does not further the policy discourse. Media that are supportive of 
a particular proposal or idea can, through sustained pressure, bring about change (Hallin 2004).  
The consequence of this is that if someone wants to propose policy such as NZ Power, that is 
somewhat nebulous, complex, and arguably ‘wonkish’, there need to be media which can 
absorb the implication of the proposal and lay the resulting debate out in a way that hits on the 
main issues, and provide an avenue for finding a resolution.   
Examining how the media interacts with the electricity sector in New Zealand is complex. It 
requires not only a quantitative measure of how often the sector is mentioned, or upon which 
issues the articles focus; it requires a more qualitative appraisal of the balance and depth of 
those articles. This section will set out how the media have engaged with issues in the sector – 
with particular reference to NZ Power.  
The first question is how often electricity issues are discussed in the media. Media here is 
defined as all electrically accessible resources, including newspapers, television and radio 
sources, and blogs.  
 
  
The number of articles in Figure 11 shows how often news articles mention electricity; and of 
those articles, how many address specific key words. There are some notable peaks: in 2006 
there were 7544 articles on the electricity sector, almost 2000 more than in 2005, and a number 
not met again until 2011 – an election year. The year 2006 was one of substantial change in the 
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Figure 11: Graph showing the composition of articles discussing electricity issues. Graph compiled 
from data gathered by media aggregator and research tool Factiva (data valid as of 1 January 2015). 
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electricity sector that flowed from the 2006 Ministerial review on the sector. It makes sense for 
there to be a peak in articles generated from this review, as it was an important change for 
consumers and the industry alike. There is also a notable increase in articles on environmental 
issues. Again, considering the nature of the Review, this is an understandable outcome.  
In Chapter 1, I showed how 2012 was a relatively quiet year for issues in the sector, but 2013 
saw the introduction of the NZ Power proposal. Notably, price as a proportion and total number 
of articles saw a significant rise in 2013. This shows the Proposal both increased the coverage 
of the sector from both the previous years, and against the average from the previous five years. 
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Figure 12: Graph showing the number of articles on the electricity sector from 1 January 2013 until 31 
December 2014 (left axis), and the proportion of those articles mentioning NZ Power (right axis, with 
the denominator being total relevant stories). Graph compiled from data gathered by media aggregator 
and research tool Factiva (data valid as of 1 January 2015). 
83 
 
What this indicates is a) the proposal could have been the cause of greater coverage of the 
sector, and b) that price became a greater emphasis for the sector. 
There were 328 unique articles written on NZ Power in the two years to 31 December 2014. 
There were an additional 340 reprintings of those articles in regional subsidiaries of national 
publications. It is clear that NZ Power was directly responsible for a considerable number of 
articles, and considering the surrounding uptick in articles mentioning electricity, it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that NZ Power had flow-on effects in the wider discussion about the 
role of electricity within the lives of New Zealanders.  
  
 
 
Simply noting that NZ Power was mentioned, and did alter the media’s discussion electricity 
issues not sufficient to answer whether the media can have an impact on the sector. When 
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Figure 13: Graph showing the relative balance of articles mentioning NZ Power. Articles labelled 
“Favourable” took a favourable stance towards NZ Power. Articles labelled “Unfavourable” took an 
unfavourable stance towards NZ Power. Articles labelled “Neutral” mention NZ Power, but take no 
stance on the proposal. Articles labelled “Framing article” offer arguments for and against NZ Power, 
without offering commentary on which argument should be preferred. Graph compiled from data 
gathered by media aggregator and research tool Factiva (data valid as of 1 January 2015). 
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examining those 328 articles, the positionality of those articles can be observed. When doing 
so, Figure 13 shows the balance that is seen. 
There are some who criticise the media of having a particular agenda when discussing issues 
(Fenby 1986), and that is true, too, for NZ Power. To the extent the media can influence 
whether the public support or oppose a proposal, it is legitimate for policy makers to be 
concerned of any perceived bias within the reporting. Examining the explicit mentioning of NZ 
Power in articles reveals that – by a metric of the number of articles with a particular bias – 
there were similar numbers of articles taking a favourable view as opposed to an unfavourable 
view of the proposal. If the impact of coverage can be decided simply by measuring the number 
of articles written about a proposal, then, by a slight margin, there should be more favourable 
views of the proposal in the wider public. 
Of course, this is not entirely how political influence works. What matters more is the impact 
individual articles have on the wider public. This is something that is very hard to measure, as 
the impact of just the media on the formation of political views is difficult to separate from any 
other impact. To the extent the impact the media can have on views is measurable, possibly the 
best metric is to measure the ‘reach’ of particular articles on the proposal. Reach measures how 
many people read a given article, and took actions such as sharing it on social media. Articles 
that have a greater reach can be seen to be more influential, and implicitly, biased articles with 
greater reach also have more influence. 
One study has been carried out on the reach of NZ Power through online media between 18 
April 2013 and 2 May 2013 (Stoddart 2013). By the end of their reporting period, articles 
mentioning NZ Power had an audience of 15,000,000 non-unique visits to articles: 
“In terms of volume, there were more favourable reports than unfavourable (38% to 35%); but 
unfavourable coverage reached a larger share of the audience (35% to 43%). About half the 
audience was reached by coverage about the policy (49%), with significantly less focused on 
its effect on the markets (34%) and still less on the political strategy (16%). The tone of 
coverage focused on each of these themes differed. Reports focused on the share markets were 
overwhelmingly unfavourable towards NZ Power, while those focused on the policy merits or 
political strategy were more favourable than unfavourable.” 
It is clear that the media are accessed by a large proportion of the public, and the views they 
espouse can influence their audience. In the case of the electricity sector, issues of price, and 
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of security of supply constitute a considerable proportion of those issues discussed; with an 
emerging role played by the environment. With particular reference to NZ Power: the proposal 
was directly responsible for a considerable increase in the role of electricity in the media, and 
pushed particularly issues of price – a key concern of the proposal. 
Some have called for the media to play a stronger role in the protection of consumer rights. 
Consumer Magazine, for instance, said that it was vital for someone to “finally start advocating 
for consumers – particularly poorer ones”. Notwithstanding the irony of a publication whose 
name is literally “Consumer Magazine” calling upon another body or media organisation to 
advocate for greater consumer rights, it also misses that a plurality of articles mentioning NZ 
Power did so in a way that supported the proposal. To the extent that articles were against NZ 
Power, a subset of those articles were also advocating the protection of consumers, but were 
simply noting that NZ Power was not the mechanism to do that. To the extent that Consumer 
Magazine and others articulated concern about the apparently neoliberal orientation within the 
sector, it has not been compellingly articulated why neoliberal policies could lead to the desired 
outcome they support. Frequently, correlation is cited, for instance “Political risk takes shine 
off power”, where it is suggested that prices have increased in the previous 12 months, and that 
this shows that there is a failed market for electricity in New Zealand. A proper investigation 
into why the market is – in the writer’s mind – failing is lacking in mainstream publications. 
 
5.3 Industry   
 
This subsection seeks to understand how the electricity sector has influenced the development 
of the sector, and considers the industry after 1999, as that date marked the establishment of 
the five gentailers, and an industry conceptually independent from government. Historically, 
gentailers have had dominant power within the sector. Owing to their entrenched market 
positions, relatively high barriers to entry for competition, and a regulatory environment which 
was not conducive to large numbers of new entrants, the gentailers sat comfortably within the 
sector, maintaining market share and influence until fairly recently with the rise of consumer 
power described in 4.1(c) and (d). 
This influence was not without its drawbacks. The bill consumers get every month for their 
electricity use comes with the letterhead and styling of the gentailer. And yet, less than half of 
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the cost of electricity that comes on that bill is actually the costs associated with the gentailer 
(as discussed in Chapter 1.3(b)). For a typical consumer, however, the breakdown of the bill to 
include GST, network charges, losses, Electricity Authority levy, and other fees is rather 
complex to understand. The fact these elements are attributable to non-gentailer entities is for 
many consumers immaterial. 
What this means it that – largely incorrectly – gentailers (and more recently independent 
retailers) bear the brunt of criticism of prices, and indeed other problems that develop within 
the sector. The perception that these companies are bad for consumers has limited the scope of 
these companies to shape public discourse in a way that is positive for them. It is for that reason 
that companies like Flick and Powershop have used marketing campaigns that focus on how 
much they are not like established retailers. Powershop’s motto, “Same power, different 
attitude”, goes with posters depicting typical villains (like Darth Vader) in more positive 
imagery. Flick focuses on a message that says consumer can “take back control of their power 
bill”. The growing success of these companies speaks in part to the dissatisfaction with the 
established retailers.  
Distribution and transmission components of the sector enjoy comparative anonymity, and 
because their responsibility is bringing, in the words of the Hamilton-based distribution 
company WEL Energy “Power to the People”, then, to the extent they are known, it is for more 
positive reasons. The exceptions are when the power fails (as in the aforementioned central 
Auckland cut of 2014), but as those events are comparatively rare, these companies have an 
easier job of maintaining a positive image. Being natural monopolies, the companies also do 
not face competition pressure. Their fee structure is regulated by the Commerce Commission, 
but the lack of competition has stifled innovation. With the adoption of distributed generation, 
their weak record of innovation is likely to become an issue for them. The legal obligation on 
distribution companies to provide connection to the grid is a recent phenomenon (having been 
established in 2007 (EECA 2010), and the companies are perceived to have not facilitated 
broader change within the sector (Interview with Ralph Matthes of MUEG 2014). Chapter 4.4 
will discuss in further detail the desire by some within the sector to improve the perception of 
retailers and generators, and to facilitate better practices by distribution companies for the 
betterment of consumers.   
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Chapter 6: Lessons from New Zealand Power 
 
NZ Power was not a successful proposal. First, it has not been put into law, not surprisingly 
perhaps as National won the general election. But this in itself is not conclusive, as first, NZ 
Power was not the only issue of the 2014 election (indeed, by Election Day it was definitely a 
background issue); and second, the policy was associated with, and only with, parties that failed 
to win the election. More significantly, a clear signal of the proposal’s failure is that polling 
suggests the NZ Power proposal was not popular among voters. Two out of three publicly-
released opinion polls conducted immediately before the announcement of NZ Power on 18 
April 2013 showed a sharp drop in support for National, with the Labour and Green parties 
enjoying the spoils of that (Roy Morgan Research 2013; ONE News 2013; Gower 2013). Two 
weeks later, on 2 May, Roy Morgan released a poll taken mostly after the NZ Power 
announcement, which showed the government back up six points, and Labour and the Greens 
down a combined 6.5 points (Roy Morgan Research.b 2013). National went on to form a 
government approximately 18 months later. However, again, this is correlational evidence, 
from a complex period in which a number of other policies were coming and going from the 
limelight fairly rapidly, and thus inconclusive. 
There was one publicly available poll, commissioned by the Green party, which showed 
support for NZ Power at 40%, and opposition at 34%, from a sample of 750 people. This poll 
was conducted between May 5 and 7 (Timaru Herald 2013). To the extent these data points 
can suggest the public’s level of support for the proposal, it would seem the proposal had, at 
best, a mixed reception.   
An additional signal is that the proposal is likely to be dropped by the Labour Party now that 
the proposal’s architect – David Parker (Interview with Brian Fallow 2014) – lost the Labour 
Party leadership battle, and new leader, Andrew Little, has called for a review of all policies – 
including NZ Power (Small and Watkins, Andrew Little confirms Labour leadership bid 2014, 
Little 2014). The Green Party’s support for the policy seems less dented (Interview with Gareth 
Hughes 2014), but will still be subject to a review.  
There are many more important questions to ask in assessing the success of a given proposal 
than asking “did it become a law?” There are a multitude of causes for a proposal to fail to gain 
support – not least of which was the unique nature of the 2014 general election in New Zealand. 
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The broader considerations in assessing a proposal’s success should look to more holistic 
questions, and in this study we focus particularly on the debate and discourse surrounding the 
proposal. Specifically, we question whether the justifications for the proposal were made clear 
by proponents and the media; whether or not the proposal went some way to resolving the 
problems laid out in the justifications; and whether the proponents were able to facilitate a 
debate on those issues. This section sets out to address those broader questions  
6.1 What is necessary for successful policies, and did NZ Power achieve that?  
 
It is as a result of the many interviews conducted for this thesis that this author believes NZ 
Power was not articulated well, and the media and politicians did not facilitate the debate over 
the policy in a constructive way. The one upside to which supporters of the policy can point is 
that the proposal brought into the spotlight the idea of “fuel poverty”; which had been largely 
absent from wider policy discussion since 2007 (NZ Herald; NZPA; Newstalk ZB 2007), 
although academics had raised it (Lloyd 2006; Howden-Chapman, et al. 2012) The Labour and 
Green parties were thus able to raise the issue of equity in relation to the electricity market. But 
considering that NZ Power was a major plank of the two parties’ 2014 campaign, and given 
the effort and energies that went into formulating the proposal, the outcomes must have been 
disappointing to the Labour and Green parties.  
Furthering discourse on a subject can be a legitimate goal and achievement for a policy 
proposal. The next section will assess whether NZ Power as a proposal was able to do this, by 
investigating first whether the proponents managed to successfully present a justification for 
an intervention in the sector; whether the proposal was something that addressed the established 
problem; and whether the proponents were able to facilitate a positive debate on the issue. 
Again, I concentrate more on the issues of discourse than on the technical issues. 
 
6.1(a) Outlining a problem, or: justifying intervention?  
 
In Chapter 1, I outlined the NZ Power proposal, as was described by its authors. According to 
the documentation provided, and speeches given, on the proposal, there are two key 
justifications for intervention in the sector; namely prices and environmental considerations – 
including a price for water.  
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Regarding the need to better provide equitable prices for consumers, a number of arguments 
were made. The first was that gentailers were able to exploit their position in the market to 
generate windfall (or super) profits for themselves. The consequence of this was rapidly rising 
electricity prices for (predominantly) residential consumers. This aspect of the policy 
justification was successfully made. As noted in Chapter 1; residential prices have indeed 
increased. The Labour and Green parties were, prima facie, successful in showing there is a 
need to address those prices.  
A considerable proportion of the justification for intervention in the electricity market came 
from the Wolak report. The report, as noted, points to rents extracted from consumers over a 
period of time. The report, commissioned by the Commerce Commission, did at first seem like 
a considerable weapon in the arsenal against the actions of gentailers, and of the established 
regulations. Problematically for the Greens and Labour, insufficient links were drawn between 
the problems highlighted in the Wolak Report, and how the NZ Power proposal would remedy 
that.  
First, there were academic arguments made that the Wolak report was flawed in its findings13. 
That high-level discussion filtered down to the media14. The major ‘problem’ for NZ Power 
was Wolak himself saying that NZ Power is “bass-ackwards [sic]”, and that the NZ Power 
proposal "may not even solve the problem, which is runaway retail prices.” (P. Smellie, 2013). 
What Wolak called for instead was greater competition in the market, and better regulation of 
the whole sector (F. Wolak 2014). Considering a key justification for NZ Power was the work 
of Wolak, these announcements and debates harmed the very premise of the proposal. 
As to the environmental concerns facing the sector, the Greens’ policy document indicated that 
a fully-realised version of the NZ Power proposal would allow for considerable control over 
investment decisions made by generation companies in the future. Specifically “NZ Power will 
be explicitly mandated to facilitate energy efficiency and favour renewable generation.” (Green 
Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 2013).  
The more nuanced approach to environmental concerns came from Labour, with the policy 
being used as a tool to price the use of water. David Parker believed that the current way in 
which water was handled meant that a public resource (but to be clear: not a public good in the 
                                               
13 For instance: (Hogan and Jackson 2010; Electricity Technical Advisory Group 2009; NZIER 2009; University 
of Auckland Energy Centre and University of Auckland Electric Power Optimization Centre 2009) 
14 For instance: (P. Smellie 2013) 
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economic sense) was being used to deliver private benefits. Putting a price on water meant that 
the “windfall” profits Parker thought companies like Meridian and Mighty River Power 
enjoyed would be captured by that price, and put back into the public sphere. Parker also 
believed that the most efficient way to price the use of the public resource was to remove the 
windfall profits directly, by reducing the revenue they earned from each kWh of electricity they 
generated. There was no discussion about the option of leaving that revenue intact, and placing 
a tax on it – and in so doing capturing some of the generators’ profit. 
The environmental consequence of doing this would be to change attitudes toward the use of 
water away from it being an under-priced resource useful for maximising profit, and towards 
something usable in the public interest (Interview with the Hon. David Parker 2014). Parker’s 
logic on this point was sound. However, it was not a central argument used by either Labour 
or the Greens, who were, as previously discussed, focussed on issues of equity, energy security 
and environmental concerns. Moreover, it is an argument that can be accused of being fairly 
“policy wonk-ish”; these issues are rather ethereal to the wider public. Arguments that are 
considering wonkish are not easily presented to the electorate (Henderson 1997). It is for that 
reason that this argument was scarcely used by Labour or the Greens in their policy documents; 
or why Parker himself seldom used the argument in public. 
6.1(b) Policy articulation 
 
Policy articulation builds from the literature on governmentality and the Overton Window. 
Policy articulation is the need for proponents to very clearly spell out the need for the policy, 
the specifics of the policy, the change it will effect, and who would benefit. In doing so, it 
becomes easier for the proponents to garner support for policy, and eventually get that policy 
enacted (Nisbet 2009).  
One of the key criticisms of the proposal – particularly from media representatives – is that the 
proposals were not clear in their objectives, and were lacking in specific detail. A charitable 
explanation was given by Ralph Matthes, of the Major Electricity Users Group who said that 
“[David Parker] was unfortunate in that he wanted to deliver such a significant change to the 
sector, but no one really understands how it worked”. Brian Fallow, Economics Editor of the 
NZ Herald, was sceptical about whether the policy was fully thought out: “Oh it was clear they 
[NZ Power’s architects] had no idea what was going on”.  
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Whether or not the proposal’s architects actually understood the finer details of the policy is 
secondary: what mattered was the wider belief in the electorate – at least among those who 
were engaged in the debate – that the proposal was incompletely thought through; and the 
justifications given were lacking substance15. This was problematic for proponents of the 
legislation for two reasons. First, it became difficult to have an informed debate on the needs 
for, and consequences of, the policy. Second: it led people to believe it was politicking, 
undermining the legitimacy of the claims made by, especially, David Parker.  
As noted, the metrics for determining whether the policy arrangement for the electricity sector 
made sense requires an assessment of security of supply, equity (price), and environmental 
issues. As also noted, these metrics exist largely within the neoliberal paradigm described by 
governmentality principles. Specifically, there was an expectation that supply must be met, and 
that prices were an important, with secondary consideration to that. Environmental concerns 
are a clear third concern. When proponents of the status quo are defending, say, prices and their 
fluctuations, they point to two aspects. First, that there is secure supply – and this is taken as 
evidence that the market is working. Second, that there are growing efficiencies found within 
the market that indicate prices are exactly where they should be. 
The Labour and the Greens were unable to shift perceptions away from a concern about 
efficiency, and the line that competition was sufficient to justify the cost of electricity. Indeed, 
arguments originally made that NZ Power would reduce prices eventually played into the hands 
of the status quo defenders who argued that prices would rise under a quasi-single buyer. For 
example, status quo defenders argued that lower prices would necessitate lower investment, 
which would lead to supply concerns, and eventually higher prices. This line played to concerns 
about poor state planning of supply in the past. Moreover, it is the sort of argument that 
Hoffman described when saying that, regardless of the accuracy of either position, conservative 
arguments are more easily made. This line appealed to the belief in the electorate that the 
government is incompetent – and indeed, considering the history of poor investment in the 
electricity sector in the past, this was not necessarily unfounded. 
                                               
15 As noted above, there have been 328 unique articles discussing NZ Power in media articles. Articles supporting 
the assertion in the text about the perception of NZ Power include: (Interview with Brian Fallow 2014; B. Fallow 
2014; Malpass 2014; New Zealand Energy & Environment Business Alert 2014; New Zealand Energy & 
Environment Business Alert 2014; Business Desk 2013; NBR Staff 2013; TransTasman 2013; Bradley 2014; 
Miller 2014). 
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Perhaps an even more important reason for the success of the status quo defenders was that the 
Government had succeeded in framing the electricity debate in terms of its own push towards 
greater competition. In terms of governmentality, the Government had emphasised repeatedly 
the neoliberal themes of competition and choice, for example with its campaigns about savings 
from switching electricity retailers through the “What’s My Number” campaign (the irony of 
this having been implemented under the previous Labour Government notwithstanding).  This 
is likely to have conditioned consumers to thinking that competition was vital, that the 
government was doing everything it could be promote competition. Moreover, it bolstered the 
argument that heavy handed government intervention would undo some 25 years of fine-
tuning. Possibly the clearest reason for the success here was rather than framing the sector as 
being complete and utterly successful for all customers, Ministers, the EA, and other authorities 
such as Prof Lew Evans underlined that time was still needed for even greater competition to 
come into effect. The concession that the system was not perfect gives an air of credibility to 
the defenders of the system, when people perceive it to not be perfectly functioning. To then 
use that premise to argue for a continuation of the work built on that legitimacy; and furthered 
the argumentation for greater – not less – competition.  
To the extent that an attempt was made to challenge the orthodoxy within the sector, it allowed 
National to paint the Greens and Labour as shifting further to the left. In a paradigm whereby 
neoliberalism is accepted by a significant proportion of the public, this was successful in 
“othering” the arguments made by the NZ Power proponents.  
Gentailers’ response to the proposal used the concerns raised by the Labour and Greens but 
within a framing similar to National’s. Specifically, they pointed to concerns over equity, and 
over security of supply, and spent their energies arguing that the proposal would hamper 
progress made in advancing both of those concerns. All gentailers promulgated this view in the 
media – suggesting that the proposal was not a genuine attempt at helping New Zealanders, but 
rather a brazen attempt at disrupting the partial sale of SOEs. The arguments made by gentailers 
were less successful than those made by National, even though they were largely consistent. 
The failure of the gentailers to create significant success can probably be ascribed to the fact 
that, to the extent there are perceived problems in the sector, they can largely be sheeted back 
to the gentailers.  
Labour and the Greens did use environmental framing, and emphasised environmental 
concerns. For Labour, this was attempted through highlighting the anti-environmental actions 
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taken by National; particularly in the implementation of the ETS. For the Greens, it built upon 
the party’s broader environmental credentials.  What the parties failed to sell to the electorate 
was that “doing more” to help the environment was necessary or vital, and that the Government 
was to blame for relatively little positive action to reduce emissions, and foster renewable 
electricity generation investment.  National was able to point to the growth in renewables such 
as wind and geothermal as evidence of “doing enough”, despite the fact that this growth may 
well have been due to actions initiated by Labour before late 2008. National also argued that 
the economic cost of an ETS meant that “doing more” would be problematic for New Zealand, 
sowing seeds of doubt about the robustness of the economic recovery if Labour were re-elected. 
Again, considering the lessons from governmentality, these results should not have been 
unexpected. Framing concerns for the environment in the fashion Labour and the Greens did – 
as a purely environmental concern, rather than, say, an economic one – is consistent with the 
evidence (DECC 2012) that this sort of framing is insufficient to foster considerable public 
support. 
Labour and the Greens failed to exploit the role of technology in the sector, and how that could 
be advantaged by NZ Power – particularly that of distributed generation. This could in part be 
because it was not central to their line of argument. Labour and the Greens did not take the 
opportunity to frame NZ Power as a proposal that challenged the gentailers acting in a cartel-
like manner in discouraging distributed generation. The practical consequence of this 
argument, had it been run, is hard to gauge. NZ Power raised the presence of fuel poverty 
within New Zealand (as noted above). If technology had been given the same platform, then 
again it could have entered wider discourse.  
Of final note is the timing of the proposal. From the 2011 Election, National worked to sell-
down a minority stake in the electricity SOEs. The timing of the release of the NZ Power 
proposal came immediately before the Initial Public Offering (IPO) for Mighty River Power – 
the first electricity company to be (part) sold. Had NZ Power been successful in reducing the 
rents extracted by particularly hydroelectric generators, then revenues to these companies – 
especially Meridian Energy, whose generation portfolio is heavily reliant upon hydrogenation 
– would reduce, and so to their value. Shares in Contact Energy and Trustpower – the two 
publicly listed electricity companies – slumped following the announcement of the NZ Power 
proposal (P. Smellie 2013). Additionally, market commentators suggested that the IPO for 
Mighty River Power suggested that the value of the company should be reduced to reflect the 
risk that NZ Power would be implemented, and that its implementation would reduce the value 
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of the company (Manawatu Standard 2013). What the price reduction indicated was that the 
market perceived NZ Power as being a threat to the underlying value of the gentailers. Without 
commenting as to whether NZ Power was actually a proposal primary driven to disrupt the 
partial asset sale, it is the perception that was created through the timing of NZ Power’s launch 
that carries weight. 
Some in the media and in the public suggested that the NZ Power proposal was a last-ditch 
attempt at disrupting the partial privatisation of the SOEs. If the first IPO was deemed a failure, 
then successive IPOs for the other electricity companies – Genesis, Mercury, and Meridian – 
could be postponed or abandoned. Coverage in the media suggests this was a possible 
motivator, and comments by industry and other stakeholders indicate this to be the broader 
perception. The Greens essentially confirmed this to be accurate, when energy spokesman 
Gareth Hughes’ gave an interview subsequently dubbed “Hey Clint!” in which Hughes was 
asked whether they, the Greens, were “pleased” that the proposal disrupted the planned asset 
sales. Hughes paused, called to his political advisor (Clint), asking him what the answer to the 
question was. The response was “That’s not why we did the policy...but we don’t want [the 
assets] sold”. Whether or not this was a political gaffe as some in the media painted it, it gave 
an insight into the motivations of the party. Labour’s David Cunliffe also suggested that NZ 
Power would reduce the value of the SOEs, and investors should decide whether “the shares 
are as gold-plated as the Government is making out” (Radio New Zealand News 2014). 
That revelation – which was the night the lead story on 3 News – dented the credibility of the 
NZ Power proposal, as rather than being able to cast the proposal as one with genuine intentions 
to help suffering New Zealanders, it was just another instance of politicking from inside the 
beltway. 
6.1(c) Conclusions  
 
There is an informal advantage that an incumbent government has over the opposition. They 
have better access to resources, like the various Ministries and Departments that report to 
Ministers. Additionally, owing to the influence governments have in framing discourse, as 
discussed in Part 2, they can encourage parties into the debate to advance their case. In an 
example of the extension of governmentality, the Electricity Authority was drawn into a 
discussion over the legitimacy of NZ Power. This was probably in breach of the independence 
the Authority should show.  
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The main lessons to be drawn from the experience of NZ Power for application in any future 
proposal are: 
1. That the electorate, the industry, a number of academic experts, and influential 
journalists currently support the market sufficiently that any debate over policy will be 
assessed against market principles and performance. To the extent that security of 
supply, equity, and environmental issues are of political importance (and history would 
suggest that at least the first two are), they too will be assessed within this paradigm. 
Attempts to challenge this framework failed with NZ Power, despite concerted efforts 
from the second and third most supported political parties in New Zealand, and despite 
misgivings among some experts about the extent of competition in the electricity 
market; 
2. Considering this, policy makers need to tailor their arguments for policy against that 
neoliberal framework. This means proponents of alternative policy proposals need to 
show how their proposals increase competition and efficiency, and improve outcomes 
for consumers (in terms of supply and price, and environmental outcomes) using the 
language and logic of markets. To an extent, this was attempted by proponents of NZ 
Power – and indeed, to an extent it was successful. It took a spirited defence on those 
fronts by National and other supporters of the status quo to deflect the arguments made 
by Labour and the Greens, and their expert supporters. 
3. The arguments that need to be made within an alternative framework need to be 
accessible to the electorate. National was able to use appealing and simple claims to 
explain how NZ Power would, in the long term, be detrimental to the goals of the sector. 
This framing approach would need to be emulated for successful proposals in the future. 
4. Assuming one can make arguments that fit within the current market-based framework, 
and they can be made in a way that is easily accessible, the individuals and organisation 
responsible for leading the campaigns needs to be perceived as being insofar as it is 
possible, objective on the issues. National was able to point to individuals such as Prof 
Lew Evans, bodies such as the independent Electricity Authority, and in the end Prof 
Wolak himself to argue NZ Power was flawed. Labour and the Greens were able to 
point to evidence from experts such as Dr Geoff Bertram, but the NZ Power proposal 
lacked effective articulation by politicians.  
5. Finally, it is clear the intention of the NZ Power proponents was genuine. When 
arguments are constructed consistent with the above four points in a context where there 
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is no ulterior motive, the chances of getting buy-in are greater. In the case of NZ Power, 
it was possible for opponents to suggest that the proposal was merely a last-ditch effort 
to disrupt the partial asset sales. To get the final buy in, the public needs to trust the 
proponents, which is made easier when they are perceived as coming “from a good 
place.” Their opposition to the asset sales muddied the waters, and may have to some 
extent weakened support  
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Chapter 7: Future avenues for reform – and who would do it? 
 
An interesting and important consequence of this study was to hear the industry, the 
government, and other stakeholder comment on what they believe to be the likely 
developments in policy within the sector. Two key components of the discussion emerged – 
the first is who would be responsible for the developments within the sector; the second was 
the shape those developments would take. The final section of this thesis will deal with these 
projections, and the debate that they might generate. The likelihood of the concepts becoming 
full proposals, or indeed being implemented, will be assessed against the framework 
established across this thesis, with NZ Power as a particular frame of reference.  
7.1 Increases in transparency on customer bills 
 
As noted in 4.2(c), a consumer’s electricity bill typically contains several cost components: 
GST, associated costs with retailing, costs of generation, Electricity Authority costs, metering, 
distribution fees, transmission charges, and market services all combine into the one bill. The 
gentailers spoken to for this thesis, and the Authority itself, wants to see consumers better 
informed of the cost components of their bills. The Authority, because it gives consumers a 
better appreciation of what is occurring within the sector, and how the institutions within it can 
be refined in the long term. Gentailers support it, for if the concept is successful, the burden of 
carrying the perception of pushing high prices on to consumers will be shared amongst other 
parts of the sector, and not just themselves. 
Change in this direction is important. It would actually empower consumers to become more 
aware of what they’re paying, and in doing, might increase their satisfaction with the sector 
(Bridges, Interview with Hon. Simon Bridges MP, Minister for Energy 2015). Greater 
awareness of the actual cost of electricity being delivered to a home empowers the Authority 
to act within their mandate to increase efficiency within the sector. Currently, with those 
component costs being less clear, it is difficult for the Authority to direct their work to fix those 
cost issues. Examining, say, a 27 cents/kWh price and seeking to make sure that price reflect a 
competitive and efficient market is a very indirect. Finding that 5 cents of that cost can be 
attributable to a component those costs should really be 4 cents means the Authority can direct 
their attention to the components, and in doing so, have a greater likelihood of success.   
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On 11 February 2015, the Authority released a draft proposal to increase consumer’s awareness 
of the costs associated with the provision of electricity (EA 2015). Proposals include: 
 Retailers should provide accurate and timely information to consumers of tariff 
components, so that consumers can know any changes to tariff structures, and whether 
those changes come from the competitive, or non-competitive aspects.  
 Retailers should invite customers to contact them for additional information on their 
bill, and show, at an aggregate level, how much distributor’s charges have changed so 
that customers have a meaningful access to information on prices. 
 Distributers should provide information to retailers so that the above information can 
easily be transmitted to end consumers.  
 All industry participants should act to ensure that all statements to the media and 
consumers are consistent with what other participants will say. This is to be ensured by 
requiring all participants to use the same calculation methodology, and that all official 
contact with consumers or the media should be cleared by the relevant participants at 
fewest three days before the release of that information. 
As it stands, the proposal will not legally compel participants to follow the proposal; rather the 
proposal forms part of a set of guidelines participants should strive to meet. The Authority will 
monitor participants’ actions to measure compliance with the guidelines, and will “name and 
shame” those who do not. The proposal suggests that the Authority will reconsider the need 
for the guidelines to be compulsory should participants not follow the guidelines compulsorily  
Considering this proposal, we can assess the likelihood of a successful implementation. The 
conclusions from 6.1(c) provide a framework against which we can assess this proposal. 
Specifically: 
1. An understanding and explanation of the framework against which the proposal will be 
assessed; 
2. Development of arguments for the proposal that fit said framework; 
3. Construct arguments that use easy logic 
4. Have the argumentation done by parties who can provide a degree of objectivity; and 
5. Have those parties be seen as lacking an ulterior motive. 
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For the purposes of this section, it is assumed The Authority is aware of the neoliberal 
framework, as the proposal explicitly seeks to enhance competition and efficiency, and to 
increase consumer choice and information. 
To the second point, in a market situation, it is preferable to give consumers greater information 
over their purchasing decisions. Consumers, generally, prefer to know where it is their money 
is going. For instance, there is support in the airline industry for fare structures that offer greater 
transparency on what services passengers are purchasing (Lawton 2002), as compared to a 
situation where tickets are all-inclusive. Arguing for this particular change in the sector is 
consistent with the expectations efficient, dynamic, and informed markets that the framework 
requires. Additionally, the Authority is striving to maintain a “light handed regulatory 
approach”, an approach which is consistent with the neoliberal approach of less unnecessary 
government intervention.  
As to the third point, the argument is straightforward. Consumers want to know for what it is 
they’re paying. Requiring retailers to include a clearer breakdown of the costs associated with 
their bills would accomplish that, with minimal work required by said retailers.  
As the methodology of calculating prices will be consistent across all participants, the results 
that are communicated will offer a degree of openness and objectivity. The ability for 
distributers to review the information provided by retailers offers a check on the ability of 
retailers to mislead consumers and the media.    
It is likely that this proposal would be successfully implemented into the New Zealand 
electricity sector. The proposal that exist now developed from the draft proposal from June of 
2014 that sought to require that retailers provide information, in a standard form, to consumers. 
Retailers and distributers alike felt that the proposal was too restrictive in its requirements on 
those parties, and the mechanism that sought to increase transparency lacked clarity. The 
Authority received this feedback, and in the February 2015 proposal, loosened the requirements 
on retailers and distributers. 
The Authority has, in the mind of this author, considered the lessons of NZ Power, and the 
broader history of change within the sector. The Authority was viewed by some as being non-
objective during the debate for NZ Power for the reasons discussed above. The Authority can 
regain some of the reputation for being objective through acting in that manner on this proposal.  
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The Authority established a goal of increasing outcomes for consumers, and its first proposal 
was too restrictive and interventionist for the sector to accept. To get greater buy-in to the goals 
of the proposal, the February proposal pared the more stringent aspects of the proposal back. 
Considering that, it is likely that consumers, and sector, will accept the proposals 
7.2 Other proposals 
 
As established, there is a divergence in opinion on the state of the New Zealand electricity 
sector. Some, like Consumer Magazine, David Parker, and Gareth Hughes, spoke to a need for 
some changes to the practices of established gentailers, which they described as oligopolistic. 
Others, like the Authority, and Simon Bridges, spoke to the current system being 
“fundamentally strong, and advantageous for consumers” (Interview with Hon. Simon Bridges 
MP, Minister for Energy 2015), with small refinements – such as the increase in transparency 
described above – being all that is needed in the long term.  
The consensus from all respondents in the course of this thesis research was that there is no 
major substantive reform anticipated for the sector. For the time of the Fifth National 
Government, all commentators believe that – short of a crisis – there will be no desire for any 
shift. This is particularly true considering the partial asset sale (Interview with Brian Fallow 
2014). Beyond this, with Labour looking likely to drop NZ Power, and a reticence within the 
wider populace for an NZ Power-type proposal for the reasons established, the medium-term 
outlook seems to be for a continuation of the basic structure that currently exists. 
To the extent disruption is expected within the sector, some expect it to come from distributed 
generation. Bertram particularly expects disruption to come from outside the market. Cheap 
solar PV technology will become more visible and viable, and he anticipates companies with 
limited or no history in the energy sector to use their capital to enter this market (Interview 
with Geoff Bertram 2015). The defensive stance of established gentailers against distributed 
generation may prove a barrier to this, but ultimately gentailers would face considerable 
pressure to change their practices. That the locus of likely change for the sector is exogenous 
speaks to the conclusions of governmentality. Within the frame set by those in power, there 
will be little change to the status quo. But should something outside that frame be influential 
enough to shift discourse – like, for instance, cheap alternatives to gentailers – then the frame 
can shift, and new practices be accepted.   
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Chapter 8: Limitations and future work 
Limitations 
 
The key limitation in this research was the lack of representation from distribution companies. 
Repeated attempts were made to contact large distribution companies, and the Energy Trusts 
of New Zealand Inc. – an organisation that acts on behalf of 22 different distribution 
companies. Many of those companies contacted to join the study did not reply to email or phone 
communication. Those that did, did not agree to participate. Particularly in light of Chapter 7, 
considering the role distribution plays in the sector, this is an unfortunate outcome.  
An additional limitation was in attempting to disentangle political factors, and questions of 
governmentality and discourse. Specifically, there is an element of uncertainty which remains 
about factors in the analysis because of the underlying confidence of the incumbent government 
during the election campaign.  The ability for successive governments to further entrench the 
role of the market in the sector makes it difficult for contrary views to be given much credence. 
Because of that, there is a natural bias towards arguments made by and for the status quo. For 
the purposes of this study, this limitation speaks to the conclusions of the thesis, and of 
governmentality. For a greater appreciation of the options the sector has for achieving the 
triumvirate goals for the sector, this is a handicap.  
Future work 
 
As has been discussed, the New Zealand electricity sector comprises both competitive, and 
non-competitive aspects. The research in this thesis has largely been concerned with the 
competitive aspects – specifically generation and retail. Future research into the drivers behind 
policy development in the sector could focus on the non-competitive aspects – particularly that 
of the distributors. There is ongoing debate regarding the non-competitive aspects of the sector 
– particularly as their perceived stagnancy sees the sector falling behind on innovation. There 
are questions as to the optimal form and quality of regulation to be developed by the Commerce 
Commission and the Authority. Government and policy frameworks do change over time. As 
the sector continues to develop, and new governments and bodies seek to reshape the sector, 
future research in a similar vein to this thesis could be conducted to provide a more 
contemporaneous appraisal of the development of the sector.    
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Part D: Conclusions 
  
This research is concerned with the depth, breadth, and nature of discourse about policy 
changes in the electricity sector, drawing on an analysis of discourse on policy change. It sought 
to also understand why the New Zealand electricity sector takes the form it has, and what that 
means for future policy decisions. Through a combination of crises, technology, and the rise of 
neoliberalism within acceptable policy discourse, the sector has developed into a dynamic 
market system, with broad acceptance from politicians, academia, and the public.  
The most important conclusion this thesis can draw is that the dominant discourse of 
neoliberalism has successfully established itself in the sector. As a consequence, debate on new 
policies happens within a construct that privileges ideas of efficiency and markets, gives 
prominence to electricity security, but puts little weight on environmental protection, equity 
and fuel poverty. It continues to see considerable sway held by gentailers, and their views, 
which have been well-aligned with those of central government in recent years.  
There is divergence in views on what form the sector should take. Those who support the status 
quo maintain a privileged position within discourse.  Those who support the ambitions of the 
sector – in pushing for what they believe to be a genuine free market that breaks the perceived 
oligopolistic position of the gentailers – are not given much air time. Those who support a 
change to regulate the market are viewed as outsiders, whose views will hurt consumers.  
The dominance of neoliberalism within the sector did not emerge from some vacuum; rather 
the sector was created in response to, and moulded by, various crises, technologies, and 
stakeholders which culminated in the shape we see today. It is understanding these 
circumstances and stakeholders that has granted insight into the way policy has been crafted, 
and how future proposal will be received by the industry and the public. 
The ideas that flow from the literature on governmentality and policy incrementalism show 
why this is the case. Those in power are able to influence policy discourse in a direction they 
support. Through the use of the position governments have within the public sphere, they are 
granted a unique ability to influence discourse, and to advocate for their particular policies, as 
was seen throughout successive governments’ work in the sector. Additionally, they can call 
upon the support of non-governmental actors – such as the Authority – to add legitimacy to the 
arguments they make on policy. Through successive incremental changes to the sector, the 
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frames used to determine the relative success of policies has changed, so that all proposals have 
come to be assessed against the market’s presumed ability to secure cheap, reliable electricity, 
in the most economic means possible. 
When reform proposals run radically counter to the direction of neoliberal ideology and 
conventional governmentality, attempting to change that frame, they do not fare well. NZ 
Power failed as a proposal in large part because the proponents were unsuccessful in 
challenging that orthodoxy. That failure reinforces the idea that for a proposal to be successful 
in the sector, it will need to act within a limited window of acceptability for new policy. 
Prospectively, developers of policy need to be aware of the failings of NZ Power, and ensure 
that they act within the orthodoxy. The governmentality at work means that it is difficult for 
those on the “outside” to influence policy in the direction they desire. They lack the implicit 
and explicit power that those on the inside –the industry and politicians – have in shaping the 
discourse.  
Even for those on the inside, having the influence to challenge market orthodoxy is limited. An 
example of a body attempting this to a limited extent is the Authority, whose recent proposal 
to increase transparency in the sector is a much less interventionist proposal than was first 
mooted. In attempting to ensure success of the policy, the policy was tailored to better suit the 
orthodoxy.   
The short title of this thesis is “Malcontents and Monopoly Rents”, reflecting an aim to gain a 
better understanding of those whose views were not accepted in the discourse, and discover 
why that is the case. These “outlier” views matter – not only because they better clarify the 
dominant views, but because they have value in their own right. The bottom line, though, for 
this sector is that there is not much room for those voices. To the extent those outlier voices 
have influence, it is within the established framework against which the sector is judged.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1:  
Electricity prices for industry in US dollars/MWh 
 1978 1980 1990 2000 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Australia 38.735 43.325 71.696 63.191             
Austria 79.83 101.277 155.69 117.512 257.018 255.682 257.629 272.66 253.924 271.9 
Belgium 114.853 140.966 166.586 132.258 265.643 232.565 231.656 264.182 249.936 263.773 
Canada 24.108 28.391 53.123 52.926 90.296 82.968 93.283 104.944 104.773   
Chile     41.226 85.421 228.492 213.189 208.826 210.793 185.384 172.339 
CzechRe
public 
34.375 38.542 26.741 54.352 191.474 192.126 185.535 210.502 198.946 205.573 
Denmark 67.899 101.583 164.474 197.441 396.352 364.78 356.292 409.192 383.426 393.926 
Estonia         117.132 123.767 127.087 136.541 138.946 174.764 
Finland 57.742 69.329 102.799 77.788 172.405 173.729 175.391 213.466 194.867 202.275 
France 80.523 114.13 150.12 101.659 164.327 159.211 165.279 186.96 175.138 193.359 
German
y 
85.394 100.538 163.801 120.645 322.807 317.866 318.742 351.71 338.753 387.628 
Greece 62.963 74.4 118.534 70.814 156.871 151.848 158.411 172.97 180.527 216.381 
Hungary   31.755 38.76 65.306 224.177 206.228 218.625 218.53 204.156 182.006 
Ireland 56.344 76.699 131.25 101.382 267.152 255.013 232.583 259.288 270.322 292.661 
Israel       93.037 155.62 136.769 139.833 148.752 151.616   
Italy 50 76.923 156.704 135.484 305.263 284.218 263.166 278.685 288.401 305.564 
Japan 93.138 117.336 176.796 214.041 206.016 227.64 232.158 261.356 276.758 242.14 
Korea 66.529 98.115 96.186 83.776 88.64 76.921 83.172 88.684 93.079 101.422 
Luxemb
ourg 
68.502 85.517 123.764 99.263 215.497 235.899 215.364 220.94 209.254 206.823 
Mexico 35.242 52.402 45.834 68.284 96.053 79.875 89.67 95.163 90.195 90.85 
Netherla
nds 
82.383 114.523 117.191 131.06 242.642 258.024 221.154 237.732 238.238 257.201 
NewZeal
and 
23.936 33.489 54.652 60.054 164.368 151.428 176.126 204.883 213.384   
Norway 28.427 35.447 73.343 57.814 151.262 132.605 175.829 170.521 135.984 148.512 
Poland .. 22.624 10.316 65.467 192.954 167.489 179.125 198.21 190.868 196.299 
Portugal 46.575 71.084 147.324 119.539 219.664 215.199 215.232 245.497 260.668 279.57 
SlovakR
epublic 
34.372 38.523 27.685 50.124 219.887 230.897 212.98 241.553 229.64 238.052 
Slovenia         167.575 183.049 185.472 201.711 193.443 212.76 
Spain 57.267 80.046 189.723 117.143 218.013 212.337 246.715 295.106     
Sweden 46.491 59.116 87.868   218.433 194.042 217.995 247.912 223.962 233.656 
Switzerl
and 
65.984 72.549 110.735 111.322 154.3 163.917 179.989 222.723 204.16 203.695 
Turkey 77 62.625 50.64 84.419 164.801 165.095 184.141 169.072 184.749   
UnitedKi
ngdom 
52.167 87.169 118.472 106.721 217.927 191.204 183.065 208.182 216.106 228.863 
UnitedSt
ates 
43.1 53.6 78.5 82 112.634 115.071 115.765 117.169 118.785 121.159 
OECD 55.186 68.206 102.418 100.94 156.16 155.489 158.307 169.306 167.306   
 
